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ABSTRACT 
The Internationalization of Emerging Market Multinationals: 
Effects of Host and Home Country Institutional Factors 
by 
ZHANG Yuanyuan 
Master of Philosophy 
As we all know, economic globalization and internationalization have sparked 
off countless studies and arguments in the past years. Some of the conventional 
theories about the internationalization of firms, however, are repeatedly challenged 
when they are applied to the less developed countries. The internationalization of 
firms from less developed countries has been a topic of growing interest in the 
international business and economics literature. In our study, we consider the 
influence of institutions from both the host and home country on entry modes of 
Chinese firms expanding overseas. Based on a sample of 314 China’s MNCs, the 
results support our hypotheses that both home and host institutions have significant 
effects on entry modes. Meanwhile, there are significant interactions between 
institutional quality of the host country and the government support of the home 
country and ownership type. At last, we find that both home and host institutional 
factors also affect the entry mode for a certain investment type, especially for the 
R&D investment. These findings have meaningful implications for understanding the 
internationalization behaviors of Chinese firms and the effect of dual institutional 
factors in studying the foreign entry modes of MNCs. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Problem Definition 
As we all know, economic globalization and internationalization have 
sparked off numerous studies and arguments in the past years. The leading 
theories of internationalization covered different perspectives such as Economics 
(Dunning 1988 & 2001, Coase 1937, Vernon 1966 & 1979), Knowledge 
Development (Johanson & Vahlne 1977, Luostarinen 1979) and Organization 
Learning (Kogut 1988). Some of them, however, are repeatedly challenged when 
they are applied to the less developed countries. The internationalization of less 
developed countries has been a topic of continuous interest in the international 
business and economics literature. 
Many studies focused on the role of home government in supporting the 
emergence of outward activities from less developed countries (Korhonen and 
Luostarinen and Welch, 1996; Child and Rodrigues, 2005). Even though some 
studies touched upon the relationship between inward and outward activities and 
technology transfer in the internationalization process (Lall 1983, Cantwell 1989), 
those studies mainly emphasized the technology learning and accumulation for 
the less developed countries, without explaining the reason for various modes 
and location choice of their outward investment. 
Our study argues that the modes and location choice of China’s outward 
investment can be explained in perspective of both home and host institutional 
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factors and the interactions between them. Our findings will not only shed new 
light on the modes and location choice of outward investment from less 
developed countries, but also contribute to the empirical studies of outward 
internationalization in the perspective of institutional factors which may provide 
better explanations for foreign entry modes of LDCs in addition to the traditional 
internationalization theories. 
1.2 Rationale 
As one of the developing countries, China is a latecomer in the international 
market. Prior to 2000, Chinese firms lack advanced technologies, managerial 
experience and marketing skills. With China poised to become the second largest 
economy in the world, however, more firms from Chinese mainland have 
become formidable players in the world marketplace. In 2008 alone, China’s 
outward FDI reached US $52 billion. The internationalization of Chinese firms 
has attracted the attention of researchers from various fields.  
Also, prior to 2003, Chinese outward investment was largely from the 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Private firms were then legally prohibited from 
investing abroad. Thus, many studies focused on the role of the government 
when doing research on internationalization of Chinese firms. After 2003, many 
private Chinese firms have expanded aggressively overseas in search of market 
opportunities, such as Haier, TCL, Huawei and Lenovo. As more and more 
Chinese firms become internationalized and move into the global marketplace, 
the outward internationalization of Chinese firms has become a topic of intense 
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interest in international business. 
Moreover, although the existing studies have examined the role of 
institutions in constraining MNCs' investment behavior, these institutions are 
mostly unilateral and involve just one country, i.e., the host country. Since the 
investment behavior of MNEs involves both home country and host country 
factors, it is necessary to examine the internationalization behavior of firms 
under the influence of dual institutions (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992).  
At last, the extant literature on entry mode neglects the role of investment 
types, which may also have great effects on the decision making of entry mode. 
Investment types, such as R&D, market-seeking or manufacturing operations are 
also closely related to the institution factors (AI-Saadon & Das, 1996; Mansfield, 
1995). For example, R&D intensity is an important contingency factor that 
influences FDI decisions (Han, 2002; Lee, 1985). Institutional quality as the level 
of intellectual property protection in the host country is a very important 
institutional factor for favoring wholly owned subsidiary (WOS) as an entry 
mode for R&D investment. Consequently, entry mode decisions may be affected 
by both institutional factors and investment types. This study will explore the 
influences of institutional factors and their interactions with investment types on 
entry mode choices. 
1.3 Research Objectives  
Based on traditional transaction cost theory, our study extends extant 
internationalization literature by integrating institutional theory and exploring the 
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effects of institutions of both host and home countries on the entry mode 
decisions of EMMNCs.  
For the first part, we consider the main effect of dual institutions on entry 
modes. Then we explore the interaction effect between those institutional factors 
by examining how both home and host country institutions jointly affect MNCs’ 
entry mode decisions between equity modes and non-equity modes (FDI vs. 
Export) when investing overseas. For the second part, we further integrate the 
investment type and try to explore the influences of institutional factors and their 
interactions with investment types on entry mode choices. We first examine the 
main effects of investment types on entry modes, and then explore the 
interactions of institutions and investment types. The key objective of this study 
is to adopt the institutional theory to explain the entry modes of MNCs from less 
developed countries, which can not be well explained by the traditional theories.  
This research adopts the quantitative study method for empirical analyses. 
The results based on a survey of 314 China’s MNCs support our hypotheses that 
both home and host institutions have significant effects on entry modes. 
Meanwhile, there are significant interactions between institutional quality of the 
host country and the government support of the home country and ownership 
type. At last, we find that both home and host institutional factors also have 
effects on the entry modes for a certain investment type, especially for the R&D 
investment. These findings have meaningful implications for understanding the 
internationalization behaviors of Chinese firms and the effect of dual institutional 
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factors in studying the foreign entry modes of EMMNCs. 
1.4 Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis is organized as follow: In chapter 2, theories about 
internationalization of firms are introduced, including transaction cost theory, 
OLI theory, IPLC theory, Process Theory, Other Behavioral Theories and 
institutional theory. We furnish a brief review of the literature on those extant 
popular theories and elaborate the research gap. In Chapter 3, we propose 
hypotheses on the entry modes choice based on institutional theories and 
investment types. In the first part, we focus on the effect of institutional factors 
and the interaction effect between them on the entry mode choice between FDI 
and export. In the second part, we integrate investment types and explore the 
effect of institutional factors on entry mode choice between WOS and JV in a 
certain investment type. Research methods are described in Chapter 4. The 
results of hypothesis testing are presented in Chapter 5. Lastly, in Chapter 6, we 
draw theoretical as well as managerial insights form the results and explore the 
implications for the role of institutional theory in the internationalization of firms 
from less developed economies and the direction for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, the definitions of internationalization of firms are reviewed 
first. Then, the traditional theories of internationalization process of firms are 
discussed. Third, it is followed by a discussion of the internationalization of 
firms in less developed countries. At last, this section analyzes the 
internationalization of firms in China. In the literature review, we point out the 
limitations of some traditional theories and emphasize the importance of 
institutional factors for examining the internationalization of firms in China. 
2.1 Definition of Internationalization 
The internationalization of firms has been captured by different terms such 
as multinational corporations, transnational enterprises, and more recently global 
companies. Researchers have defined internationalization from different 
perspectives.  
From an outcome perspective, some researchers use “foreign sales as a 
percentage of total sales” as criteria of internationalization of firms (Stopford and 
Dunning, 1983). The multidimensional measure of internationalization focus on 
five characteristics of firms: 1) having manufacturing operations in multiple 
regions/countries, 2) integration of resources globally, 3) leading product quality, 
4) world-class R&D capability, 5) well-known brand in the world market 
(Morgan and Katsikeas, 1997). Both the two definitions are suitable in this study 
since they focus on results of internationalization, but the former is more 
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objective and the later is based on the subjective perspective. 
From the process perspective, internationalization is frequently described as 
“…..the outward movement of a firm’s international operation” (Johanson and 
Vahlne, 1997; Johanson and Wedersheim-Paul, 1975; Luostarinen, 1979). 
Previous researchers divided the entry mode for the outward movement to new 
foreign markets into two ways: exporting (directly or through independent 
channels), and foreign direct investment (FDI) (joint ventures, acquisitions, 
mergers, and wholly owned new ventures). Entry modes vary in the degree of 
control that a firm has over invested tangible and intangible assets. Therefore, 
according to the concepts of international product life cycle and organization life 
cycle, internationalization is also considered to be a gradual, sequential process 
through different stages. 
2.2 The Leading Theories for Internationalization of Firms 
Transaction Cost Theory  
Classical economics claimed that due to the perfect competition in market, 
price mechanism may lead to the optimum allocation of the resources. 
Transaction cost theory originated from Coase (1937). He did not explain the 
firm behavior in the perspective of production function, rather claiming that firm 
dependency and market dependency are two different strategies, which one is 
preferred when the transaction cost is lower. Transaction cost arises when MNCs 
are more efficient than markets and contracts in organizing interdependencies 
between agents located in different countries. It includes the searching cost, 
bargaining cost, contract cost, supervision cost and default cost (Coase, 1937). 
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Since it always claims that transaction cost generally refers to all the costs 
caused by transactions, it is difficult to obtain a specified classification for 
different kinds of transaction cost. Williamson (1975) classified the transaction 
cost into: searching cost, information cost, bargaining cost, decision cost, 
supervision cost and default cost. Williamson (1985) further divided transaction 
cost into “ex ante” cost (contract cost, negotiation cost and monitoring cost etc) 
and “ex post” cost (adjusting cost, bargaining cost, construction cost and 
restriction cost). Dahlman (1979) classified the transaction cost in specified 
categories in Table 1. 
When there is interaction between the individuals and transaction 
environments, the market failures may happen to due to the rise of transaction 
barriers, which lead to the transaction cost. Referring to the sources of the 
transaction cost, Williamson (1975) also suggested six sources of transaction 
costs, including bounded rationality, opportunism, uncertainty and complexity, 
small numbers, information asymmetric and atmosphere. Those six sources of 
transaction cost originate from asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency of 
transactions. (Williamson, 1985) 
One of the most important issues of internationalization concerns the reason 
for firms to choose a suitable entry mode in a foreign market. Several theories 
have been put forward to explain the entry modes choice of firms. The 
transaction cost theory posits that in choosing entry modes, firms make trade-offs 
between control (or the level of integration) and cost of resource commitment. 
On one hand, control is the focus of the entry mode literature because it is the 
single most important determinant of both risk and return. To take control, the 
entrant must assume responsibility for decision-making, responsibility a firm 
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may be unwilling or unable to carry out in uncertain foreign environment 
(Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). Control also entails commitment of resources, 
including high overhead. Therefore, when entering into an uncertain foreign 
market, high-control modes may increase return and risk while low-control 
modes (e.g., licenses and other contractual agreements) minimize resource 
commitment (hence risk) but often at the expense of returns. The argument above 
is often under conditions of considerable risk and uncertainty, particularly in 
lesser-known foreign markets. 
Table 1: Transaction Cost Categories 
Cost Categories Cost Contents 
ex ante cost 
Search costs The cost for searching for the available 
information and services 
Negotiation costs 
Includes those costs incurred in the 
preparation of the project design 
document that also documents 
assignment and scheduling of benefits 
over the project time period. It also 
includes public consultation with key 
stakeholders 
Project documentation costs Development of a baseline and 
monitoring plan 
ex post cost 
 
Monitoring costs Costs to collect data 
Enforcement costs Includes costs of administrative and legal measures incurred in the event of 
departure from the agreed transactions 
Transfer costs Brokerage costs 
Source: Dahlman, 1979 
Moreover, the mode choice may also be influenced by the level of 
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firm-specific technology (asset specificity), since firms with greater technology 
may incur higher transaction costs in safeguarding their technology from 
misappropriation (Hennart, 1991; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Williamson, 
1985; Brouthers, 2010). Asset specificity refers to those assets that lose value in 
alternative use (Williamson, 1985). To safeguard specific assets from potential 
opportunism problems, firms may adopt high control modes (e.g., wholly owned 
subsidiary) (Gatignon and Anderson 1988, Hennart, 1991; Makino and Neupert, 
2000). Firms with less specific asset may be less concerned with opportunism 
and more concerned with mode efficiency (Brouthers, 2010). Therefore, 
transaction cost theory also suggests that firms holding high specific asset tend to 
choose the modes with high control rights while firms holding low specific asset 
tend to choose modes with low control rights. 
Many previous studies use TCA (Transaction Cost Analysis) and 
internalization theory to explain the internationalization behaviors (Reid 1983, 
Saul, Gary and Victor 1990, Buckley 1988, Horaguchi and Toyne 1990). There 
remain some limitations for those two theories. Dow (1987) argues that it is 
inconsistent to invoke bounded rationality as a necessary assumption in the 
analysis of contracts and governance structures, and then assume that 
substantively rational choices can be made with respect to the contracts and 
governance structures (that are imperfect because of bounded rationality). On the 
other hand, transaction cost theory is more based on the developed countries that 
hold certain specific assets or technology advantages. Thus, when explaining the 
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influence of specific asset on the entry mode choice, it is hard to explain why 
some less developed countries which do not hold the specific assets remain to 
take the mode with more control rights (e.g. wholly owned subsidiary). Moreover, 
follow the transaction theory, transaction costs tend to be low in highly 
competitive markets, thereby providing little or no incentive to substitute internal 
organization for market exchange. It fails to explain the internationalization of 
firms from lowly competitive markets and high transaction cost. At last, follow 
the internalization theory, when faced with an inability of markets to impose 
behavioral constraints and enforce simple contracts, firms are expected to 
internalize transactions to reduce costs of exchange. It overemphasizes that the 
internal system always has high efficiency than the external market and neglect 
the fact that internalization is not almighty in any circumstances. 
OLI Theory 
Eclectic Paradigm theory by Dunning (1988) suggests that firms taking 
appropriate outward activities should be based on the three factors they own: 
ownership (O), location (L) and internalization (I) advantage. Since the 1960s, 
International Production Theory could be divided by Industrial Organization 
Theory, Firm Theory and Financial Theory. However, Dunning argued those 
theories could not explain the international production behavior comprehensively. 
Based on those three theories above, and combined with the Location Theory, he 
suggested the OLI (Ownership-Location-Internalization) Model. In fact, OLI 
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theory is consistent with Transaction Cost theory in a certain extent, but more 
comprehensive.  
The O-advantages refer to firms that have the economic advantages and hold 
the characteristics and capabilities that other competitors lack. Dunning (1993) 
identified two kinds of ownership advantage, asset advantage and transaction 
cost minimizing advantages, which arise from the availability of human, 
knowledge and physical capital as well as specific intangible related  to 
property rights, marketing, organization, information processing, learning, 
managerial skills, governance and trust, finance, experience with foreign market, 
etc. The latter advantage was more emphasized. 
The L-advantages are the attractions of comparative advantages for the 
policies and investment environment in the place of production, including the 
geographical position, relative price of the production factors, current and 
potential market demand, transportation and communication cost, infrastructure, 
government intervention, culture distance, etc. (Terpstra and Yu, 1988; Agarwal 
and Ramaswami, 1992,Root, 1987,Brouthers et al., 1996) . Dunning (1988) 
suggested when the host countries have large location advantages, they would 
like to choose the entry modes into foreign markets. L-advantages not only affect 
the firms’ internationalization tendency, but also have influence on the foreign 
direct investment sectors and international production categories. 
The I-advantages refer to firms that keep the advantages inside of the firms 
to avoid the adverse effect of imperfect market. The incomplete outside market 
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includes the structural incompleteness as competitive barrier and government 
intervention, and nature incompleteness as information asymmetry and high 
transaction cost. Firms can gain the maximum benefit through internalization if 
they lose the ownership advantages caused by the market incompleteness. 
The Eclectic Paradigm above discussed the influences of these three kinds of 
advantages on the firms’ outward activities. The different combination of these 
advantages will have a different effect on the firms’ foreign market entry mode. 
(Table 2)  
Table 2: Foreign Market Entry Mode 
 Categories of advantages 
Ownership 
advantages 
Internalization 
advantages 
Location 
advantages 
Form of 
market 
entry 
Licensing Yes No No 
Export Yes Yes No 
FDI Yes Yes Yes 
Source: Dunning, 1981. 
Until now, OLI theory is remains to be one of the most comprehensive 
theories to explain the international expansion of firms. It not only discusses the 
effect factor for international production, but also explains all outward activities 
of the firms. This approach attempts to analyze who, where and why of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) activities in term of OLI advantages and has dominated 
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international business research for the last two decades. Especially, the location 
advantages provide more explanatory power for the effect of firm-specific factors 
on the entry mode choice. 
However, as this theoretical perspective is based on the transaction cost 
considerations and emphasizes the firm-specific advantages (FSAs) s largely 
related to Western MNCs in the internationalization process. OLI theory has 
some common limitations similar to those of the transaction cost theory. It is 
more based on the developed countries and fails to explain the outward activities 
of the countries which do not hold those advantages. Although it is generally 
regarded as a complementary theory; there are some overlaps for the 
explanations of those three advantages. At last, OLI theory fails to explain the 
case that firms from less developed countries expand into overseas market just in 
order to acquire particular resources that they do not have. 
IPLCTheory 
International product life cycle theory was originally provided by Vernon 
(1966), emphasized the role of “innovation, scale, ignorance, and uncertainty” 
and discarded the classical assumption that knowledge is a free good. It 
suggested three stages for the product development in the world market: (1) 
Location of new products: a new product is developed in an advanced country, as 
U.S. (2) Maturing: as the development, the production begins to extend to some 
developed countries to seize the market in those countries. (3)Standardization: 
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the production becomes standardized and the product is produced in more 
developed countries, advanced country becomes the importing country soon. 
At the very beginning, the production is located in the innovative country. 
When a product becomes mature, its degree of standardization and consequently 
of price elasticity of demand increases; production and transaction cost become 
more and more important and the production will move to other developed 
countries. 
According to Vernon’s theory, Wells (1968) provide an international trade 
cycle which could be divided into four stages: 
(1) Innovation and U.S. export strength. 
(2) Foreign production starts, U.S. grab most foreign markets. 
(3) Foreign production competitive in export markets 
(4) Import competition begins. 
At the first stage, even though there are many reasons for the U.S. 
entrepreneurs to produce in foreign countries, they still prefer to start 
manufacturing at home to be close to the market for translating demands for 
products design changes into more suitable ones and better communication with 
specialized suppliers. During the second stage, as income and product familiarity 
abroad increase, foreign producers begin to manufacture similar products. Even 
U.S. exports still supply most of the world’s markets, they will decline gradually. 
At the third stage, foreign goods become competitive and will gradually take 
over the markets abroad which were previously held by American exports. 
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Finally, as the foreign manufacturers reach mass production, U.S. will face 
severe import competition. 
As the acceleration of information flow and the change in the national 
markets of advanced industrialized countries, Vernon (1979) redefined the 
hypotheses to explain the international trade in terms of the product cycle. It 
classified multinational companies in to three ideal types and sought to explore 
their likely behavior. The product life cycle is reconsidered to a certain extent 
and weakens the explanatory power for the international behaviors of some 
firms.  
Except for various empirical test (Vernon1967, Mousouris 1972, Ayal and 
Igal 1981, Almor, Hashai and Hirsch 2006), there are also some supplementary 
studies for IPLC theory, Tsurumi(1977) emphasized the role of country market 
for the product life cycle. The innovative country makes production in order to 
satisfy the demand in their domestic market with high income at first, then move 
to other developed countries market which there is an increasing desire for the 
new products. And the other developed countries will modify the products to 
adapt for their own markets, eventfully compete with the innovative country for 
both the domestic and foreign markets.  
In summary, the IPLC model suggests that many products go through a cycle 
during which high-income, mass-consumption countries initially export products. 
As development of the products, those countries eventually lose their export 
markets and become importers of those same products (Vambery, Robert and Yun, 
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1993). The standardized technique of production is key factor to the 
internationalization of firms from the IPLC perspective and the innovation of a 
new product is emphasized at the first phase of the cycle. 
Therefore, IPLC theory does not quite match the situation in some less 
developed countries, which would import the products and learn the technology 
from other countries at the very beginning. The emphasis on the product 
development and standardization would be the key limitation of the application 
of IPLC theory in less developed countries. On the other hand, IPLC theory can 
not explain the influence of the technology innovation in some new economic 
fields (such as information technology) on the internationalization strategy of 
firms. 
The Process Theory and Other Behavioral Theories 
Transaction cost theory and internalization theory do not regard the firm 
internationalization behavior as a gradual process since they believe the firm may 
not have distinct advantages of scale in different time period. There is, however, 
another internationalization theory so-called process theory or the knowledge 
development theory, which suggests that internationalization is an incremental 
process.  
The internationalization process theory is of Nordic origin, being formalized 
and popularized by Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) and Johanson and 
Valhne (1977). This theory is based on the research of organization behavior and 
treats firm internationalization as a gradually improved process. Firms increase 
the resources investment step by step in the whole developing process and 
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improve the information controllability in the foreign markets.  
It is also believed that internationalization is the product of a series of 
incremental decisions. In this incremental process, manager’s gradual 
accumulation of experimental knowledge of foreign market reduces the “psychic 
distance (a set of factors preventing or disturbing the information flows between 
firms and foreign markets, such as language, culture, political system, level of 
education, and the level of industrial development)” (Johanson and Valhne, 
1977). 
In brief, firms start with no regular export activities, begin to export via 
agents, and then establish their own foreign sales subsidiaries, and finally move 
to production by investing in foreign countries. According to the theory, firms 
expand internationally through various stages: from low risk, low-commitment 
mode of entry -- direct exporting -- to high risk, high-commitment modes of 
entry -- foreign sales and manufacturing subsidiaries (Johanson and 
Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975).  
Other perspectives on firms' internationalization include the adaptation of 
organization learning theory and the resource-based view in the 
internationalization context. Organizational learning theory explains the 
incremental process of knowledge development (Szulanski 1996). Organizations 
not only hold specialized knowledge, but also have the opportunity to learn from 
other organizations. However, even though the knowledge is available, 
organizations may not be able to access such knowledge, because they may not 
have the same capability of learning to absorb and apply it for its own use. 
Difference in their absorptive capabilities then explains the probability of local 
firms to develop knowledge of international business (Tsang 1999).  
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While previous research on the internationalization of firms has focused on 
the outward activities: exporting or setting up oversea subsidiaries, several 
researchers recognize that there is clearly an equivalent process of inward 
activities as multinational firms engage in foreign sourcing activities (Korhonen 
&Luostarinen & Welch 1996). These researchers emphasize that inward activities 
play a key role in the process of knowledge development and resource 
acquisition among local firms and greatly affect their outward 
internationalization (Welch & Luostarinen 1993). They suggest that domestic 
firms can begin the knowledge development process by engaging in inward 
activities, such as becoming a distributor of foreign products or forming a joint 
venture (JV) with a foreign company (Bjorkman and Kock 1995). Firms may 
also be integrated into the global economy through inward internationalization or 
up-stream internationalization. The inward internationalization process is very 
relevant for multinationals from less developed economies, where firms often 
begin their initial contact with the international markets by being a customer, 
supplier, or distributor for multinationals from advanced economies. 
Advocates of the process theory contend that acquisition of knowledge about 
foreign markets allows the firm to enhance its learning abilities, reduce the 
uncertainty and risk often associated with international business, and improve its 
competitive position (Robock and Simmonds 1989, Autio et al 2000). And also 
some previous studies conducted an empirical test of this theory and foundt that 
process development theory is mainly applicable to the internationalization 
behavior in small and medium-sized enterprises (Bilkey & Tesar，1977；Johanson 
and Nonaka,1983; Ali & Camp,1993).  
However, the basic assumption of this theory was challenged by some 
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previous studies. (Oviatt and Mcdougall， 1994； Schrader et al， 2000；Autio 
and Sapienza，2000) The main criticism is that process theory emphasizes 
internationalization become at the later stage of the organization growth process. 
It fails to explain some firms which the outward activities take place during the 
venture creation process or in the early stage of venture growth. On the other 
hand, it fails to explain the leapfrogging of certain stages by internationalizing 
firms. 
Institutional Theory 
Institutions can be defined as humanly devised constraints that structure 
political, economic and social interactions (North, 1990). Levchenko (2007) 
claimed that institutions typically refer to a wide range of structures that affect 
economic outcomes: contract enforcement, property rights, investor protection, 
the political system, and the like.  
Scott (2001) argues that there are three pillars of institutions: the regulative, 
the normative, and the cognitive. Regulative or the legal aspect of institutions 
commonly takes the form of laws and regulations. They guide the actions and 
perspectives of organizations or firms by the threat of legal sanctions. For 
example, corporations adopt new pollution control technologies to conform to 
environmental regulations, and nonprofit organizations maintain accounts and 
hire accountants in order to meet tax law requirements (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). Normative or the social aspect of institutions generally take the form of 
rules-of –thumb, standard operating procedures, occupational standards and 
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educational curricula. This aspect guides the actions and perspectives of 
organizations or firms by social obligation or professionalization. Cognitive or 
the cultural aspect includes symbols-words, signs, and gestures as well as 
cultural rules and frameworks. Cognitive institutional aspect forms a culturally 
supported and conceptually correct basis of legitimacy which may not be 
questioned. For example, it is regarded as natural that environmental activists 
pursue idealistic or collectivist interests, whereas corporations pursuer economic 
and materialistic goals (Hoffman, 1999). 
While the conventional firm-specific factors have been criticized for offering 
a narrow view of organizational activities and only focusing on the technical 
environments of individual transactions, there is a greater need to take the 
country-specific factors into consideration based on a boarder institutional 
environment. Institutions are shared, collective understandings or rules of 
conduct reflected in laws, rules, governance mechanisms, and capital markets 
(DiMaggio & Powell 1991; North 1990). Institutional factors include elements in 
the technical environment as well as cognitive and sociological elements, such as 
norms, standards, and expectations shared by relevant members. Each 
organization is embedded in both its own internal institutional environment, 
which consists of the structures, systems and practices established in the past as 
well as its external institutional environment.  
Until now, most studies of institutional factors have focused on the attributes 
of the host countries in the internationalization process and have largely 
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neglected the role of the home country institutional factors. While the 
institutional quality and investment incentives of the host country can help attract 
foreign investors, institutional factors from the home country such as government 
support and ownership type of firms may also affect their internationalization 
behaviors, especially for those firms from emerging market economies such as 
China (Peng et al. 2008). This study takes into account both of the host country 
and home country institutional factors and also their interactive effects on the 
foreign market entry modes of EMMNCs.  
Institutional theory provides a new perspective of ownership strategy for 
foreign expansion. The traditional theories on internationalization tend to view 
the difference between wholly owned and shared ownership as a matter of the 
alignment of control rights between partners (Makino and Beamish 1998). 
Institutional theory suggests ownership may be a means of conformity to the 
institutional environment. When firms expand overseas, they face a dual pressure 
of conformity: to the national environment of the host country, and to the 
organization al practices within the multinational enterprise (Rosenzweig and 
Singh 1991). 
Yiu and Makino (2002) argued that institutional theory differs from 
transaction cost theory in at least two important areas. First it pays more attention 
to contextual variations in institutional environments. Even transaction cost 
theory has mentioned some institutional constraints in their models (Williamson 
1991), their focus has been limited to certain aspects of regulative institutions, 
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and the normative and cognitive domains of the institutional environment are 
mentioned comparably less (Roberts and Greenwood 1997). Second, key 
determinants considered to have an impact on the choice of organizational 
structure differ between transaction cost and institutional theories. Transaction 
cost theory focuses on “efficiency” as the primary determinant of the choice of 
organizational structure, while institutional theory regards “legitimacy” as the 
primary factor. 
2.3 The Internationalization Theories for Less Developed Countries 
The leading theories above mainly take the developed countries as the 
research target. Since 1960s and 1970s, many LDCs begin to engage in outward 
activities and gradually become the import part of international labor division. 
Some LDCs are moving away from wholly inward-oriented import substitution 
policies toward outward-oriented export-led growth (Aulakh, Kotabe, and 
Teegen, 2000). Compared with the developed countries, however, most LDCs do 
not hold the competitive advantages or monopolistic advantages. Some new 
theories are required to explain the internationalization of firms from those 
countries and some new factors are required to be considered in the new global 
marketing circumstance. 
2.3.1 The Motivation of Outward Activities in Less Developed Countries 
Wells (1977, 1986) elaborated systematically for the internationalization 
behavior in developing countries. He claimed that the main motivations of 
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outward activities of developing countries include the following points: 
Protect the Export Market: Based on the research on many countries in Asian 
and South America, Lewis (1991) found that because of the trade barriers as 
tariff and quota limits, export is not a long-time plan for international operation 
procedure for those countries, the capital investment in foreign markets, however, 
protect most of their market. 
Lower Cost: as the developed countries, the developing countries are searching 
for the districts where have lower wage labors than their own to compete with the 
export from other countries. Some countries invest in the third country to save 
the transportation cost. 
Race Relations:  Developing countries make outward activities to serve the 
same racial group. The outward investments linking to race relations are taking 
some proportions in total outward investments amount, especially in India, 
Thailand, and Hong Kong.  
Risk Aversion:  The political situation in some developing countries is instable 
and leads to the capital outflow from domestic enterprises. They engage in 
outward activities to disperse such risks. 
Other Motivations: They include the support of host county governments, 
suggestions of consultant institution and staff training. 
Ghymn (1980) also pointed out that based on different degree of economic 
development, LDCs show variety of interesting motivations: 1. ethnic ties, 2. risk 
reduction from economic and political instability at home, 3. solidification of 
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business with trade partners, and 4. manpower exports. 
Dunning(1993) argued that there are three key motivations for FDI: strategic 
asset-seeking, resource-seeking, and market-seeking. Based on his argument, it is 
claimed that some newly industrialized economies (NIEs) tend to invest in DCs 
for either strategic asset-seeking or market-seeking purposes, small and large 
LDCs for resource/labor-seeking purposes, and large LDCs for both resource and 
market-seeking purposes (Makino, Lau and Yeh, 2002) 
2.3.2 The Advantages of Less Developed Countries  
Multinationals from LDCs usually utilized smaller scale, more 
labor-intensive, more flexible (among inputs and outputs) technology than did 
other MNEs and often domestically owned firms (Lecraw 1977, 1979, 1981). 
Their output was generally of lower quality than that of other MNEs and they 
competed based more on lower price than on product differentiation (Wells 1983; 
Lecraw 1977, 1981) 
Makino, Lau and Yeh (2002) also claimed that there are three capabilities to 
support the investment of NIEs: labor intensive production capability, 
technology-based assets, and prior technology-seeking experience. All these 
three capabilities are firm-specific factors. For the country-specific factors, there 
are either natural endowments (e.g., low cost labor and natural resources) or 
created endowments (e.g., strategic assets) available in a host country (location). 
Other literature on the advantages of firms in LDCs includes the following 
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three parts. 
Small-scale Technical Advantages 
Wells (1977, 1986) suggested that since the lower income countries have 
limited market capacity, they may not able to gain the scale benefits through the 
large scale production. Many enterprises in the LDCs develop some technology 
skills which are labor intensive, production flexible and very suitable for small 
scale production. Because of this kind of competitive advantage, the LDCs sell 
the products at a lower price. Because of the low production cost and low labor 
wage, cheap price is always a powerful arm for seizing the market share and the 
competitive advantage compared with the developed countries. 
Technical Localization 
Lall (1983) claimed that the localization process of techniques in LDCs is 
highly related with the factor price and quality in their own countries. For 
small-scale enterprises, they can only benefit from these technologies if the 
products can satisfy their own economic conditions and demands and also satisfy 
medium and low consumption demands. Those conditions above lead to the 
enterprises in LDCs to engage in internal innovative activities to construct and 
develop their own competitive advantages.  
Technique Innovation and Upgrade  
Firms from LDCs are always regarded as lacking advanced technology and 
specific assets. Cantwell, Tolentino and Paz (1990), however, explored the 
technique innovation and upgrade theory in 1990s to explain the accelerated 
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growth of direct investment to the developed countries from the LDCs in 1980s. 
It was claimed that technological accumulation promotes the economic 
development of one country. The LDCs may not have powerful R&D capabilities; 
however, they grasp and develop the existent techniques through learning 
experience and organizing capacity. It was also claimed that the industrial 
distribution in the LDCs is predicable and changes as time goes on. 
2.4 The Internationalization for Chinese Firms 
Several reports indicate the more and more important role of China as an 
investor country in recent years. By 2004, China was the eighth most important 
source of FDI among developing countries (UNCTAD, 2005). A survey in 2005 
also points out that China would become a top four source country of FDI over 
the period 2005-2008 (UNCTAD, 2005). As revealed in UNCTAD’s World 
Investment Report 2010, China is at the third position for FDI outflow, only 
behind USA and France, with Chinese FDI outflow up to100 billion dollars 
(UNCTAD, 2010). 
Chinese outward investors can be regarded as being state-owned in the 
period under study, since private firms were legally prohibited form investing 
abroad prior to 2003. Since 1979, when outward direct investment (ODI) was 
formally permitted under the “Open Door” policies, the internationalization of 
Chinese firms has been tightly controlled by national and provincial government, 
either directly, by administrative fiat, or indirectly , via economic policy and 
other measures designed to advance the economic development agenda (Buckley 
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et al., 2006,2007). Initially, OFDI was permitted on a very selective basis. 
However, in recent years administrative controls have been relaxed, approval 
processes and procedures streamlined, and the ceiling raised on the amount of 
foreign exchange that can be committed to individual investment projects 
(Sauvant, 2005). 
The development of Chinese outward FDI experience has gone through three 
stages. Between 1979 and 1985, China established 185 non-trading foreign 
affiliates, mostly in the form of joint ventures. These oversea enterprises spread 
over 45 countries and economies, primarily in the developing world. Many of 
these early investment activities were to a great extent motivated by the 
government’s policies rather than commercial interests (Cai, 1999). In the 
1985-1990 period, China established 577 non-trading foreign affiliates. These 
oversea enterprises spread over 90 countries and economies (including developed 
countries), were involved in a much wider range of industries, such as 
metallurgy/minerals, petrochemicals/chemicals, electronics/light industry, 
transportation, finance/insurance, medicine and tourism (Cai, 1999). In the 
1990-present period, China’s overseas direct investment began to expand at an 
unprecedented rate (Yang, 2003). China has become one of the top FDI exporters 
among developing economies (Cai, 1999). 
Although the traditional theories can be readily applied to emerging 
economy investors in certain respects, they have some inevitable limitations for 
explaining the outward activities of firms from less developed countries as we 
 29
mentioned in the above parts. Buckley et al. (2007) argued that in the case of 
emerging economy MNEs, especially for Chinese firms, there are likely to be 
particular imperfections in home country capital markets that (potential) outward 
investors can exploit. The imperfections are from (1) the state-owned (and 
state-associated) firms may have capital made available to them at below market 
rates; (2) inefficient banking systems may make soft loans to potential outward 
investors, either as policy or through inefficiency; (3) conglomerate firms may 
operate an inefficient internal capital that effectively subsidizes FDI; (4) family 
owned firms may have access to cheap capital form family members. Buckley 
(2004) also claimed that those market imperfections may be transformed into 
ownership advantages by emerging economy firms. 
Except for the market imperfections, the ownership advantages in China 
including flexibility, economizing on the use of capital or resources, benefits 
accruing from home country embeddedness (i.e., prior familiarity of operating 
within an emerging market context), and the networking skills (i.e., the ethnic or 
familial ties with the population in the host country) are mentioned by some 
researchers as well (Wells, 1983, Erdener and Shapiro, 2005; Lau, 2003; Buckley, 
2007). 
In recent years, the institution-based view become more popular for 
explaining the outward activities of emerging MNEs, and it is believed to have 
the potential to help explain distinctiveness in the behavior of outward-investing 
Chinese firms (North, 1990; Peng, 2002, Meyer and Nguyen, 2005). Those 
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institutional factors include the home institutional environment which is formally 
and informally enforced by government and its agents (Scott, 2002), the norms 
and cognitions (Buckley, 2007) and high levels of government support, typically 
in the form of privileged access to raw materials and other inputs, low-cost 
capital, subsidies and other benefits help emerging country firms to offset 
ownership and location disadvantages abroad (Aggarwal and Agmon, 1990). 
Until now, however, there has not been a comprehensive study focusing on 
the effect of institutional factors (including both of the home-institutional and 
host -institutional factors) on the entry mode choice of Chinese multinationals. 
Particularly, the interaction effect of the institutional factors on the entry mode 
choice is mentioned less by extant studies.    
2.5 Summary 
Not only from the economic perspective, or from the behavioral perspective, 
the leading theories of internationalization including the transaction cost 
perspective (Anderson & Gatignon 1986), the OLI framework (Dunning 1988), 
the IPLC theory (Vernon 1966, 1979), and the knowledge development process 
model (Johanson & Vahlne 1977) are largely based on studies of firms from 
developed economies and emphasize the firm-specific assets, the advanced 
technology and the gradual process of knowledge development. These theories 
are inadequate for explaining the internationalization behaviors of firms from 
less developed countries. The expansion of emerging MNEs offers a unique 
opportunity for theoretical development and empirical research of the factors that 
 31
drive the internationalization of firms (Child & Rodrigues 2005).  
Although recent developments in this area have shifted attention to the role 
of institutional factors on the overseas investment behaviors of MNEs (Peng et al. 
2008), they have not developed a comprehensive study on the effect of 
institutional factors on the entry mode choice, but rather considered the effects of 
institutional factors of the host country or those of the home country separately. 
Nor is there enough empirical evidence to suggest that the influence of both 
home-institutional and host-institutional factors for Chinese MNEs. In other 
words, a comprehensive framework is needed to shed light on the entry mode 
choice in the perspective of institutional factors. 
 
 32
CHAPTER 3. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Institutional Factors and Entry Mode Choice 
Firms face two types of risks when entering a foreign market. On one hand, 
there are contractual risks with high transaction cost for the firms with ownership 
advantages when they engage in international transactions. On the other hand, 
firms face environmental risks when they enter an unfamiliar market. Facing the 
dual risks, firms make a trade-off between the high control modes to protect their 
particular know-how and minimize the transaction cost and the low control 
modes that allow adapting their strategies flexibly in an uncertain environment. 
Based on the conventional theoretical thinking, firms without ownership 
advantages, such as those from less developed countries, are expected either to 
avoid entering foreign markets or use a low control mode such as exporting. 
In recent years, however, multinationals from emerging market economies 
such as China, India and Brazil have expanded rapidly in the international 
markets in search of market opportunities, natural resources, and strategic assets 
such as brand, technology and distribution channels (Child and Rodrigues 2005). 
Although these firms may lack firm-specific advantages, they have been 
observed to enter foreign countries with high-control modes such as joint 
ventures (JVs) and wholly owned subsidiaries (WOS). While the usual 
location-specific factors remain an important variable when explaining their 
entry modes choice, they have been referred to mainly host country factors. In 
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recent years, the location-specific factors have been extended to the home 
country factors and particularly the home country institutions, especially for 
firms from less developed countries, which often “leverage” their relationship 
networks and incentives and support from their home governments in their 
overseas expansion. In the absence of firm-specific advantages (FSAs), these 
home country institutional factors may entail certain comparative ownership 
advantages or country-specific advantages (CSAs), which can help shed light on 
the entry mode strategies of firms from emerging market economies (Cantwell et 
al. 2010; Sun et al. 2011).  
As the transaction cost theory has been criticized for offering an 
under-socialized view of organizational activities (Granovetter, 1985), 
institutional theory has emerged as a more complementary approach to the study 
of organization-environment relations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2001; 
Zucker, 1987). At first, it can better explain why some EMMNCs without 
specific assets can choose the high control modes in a foreign market. Moreover, 
unlike the transaction cost theory that is constrained to the “economic school”, 
institutional theory integrates more social-specific factors, such as home 
government support, which are more in line with China's actual conditions. At 
last, as EMMNCs are more concerned with environmental risks than transaction 
costs, institutional factors can affect firms’ perceptions and tolerance of risks. In 
this study, we examine the effects of institutional factors from both the host 
country and home country on the foreign entry modes of EMMNCs. For the host 
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country institutional factors, we focus on the institutional quality and cultural 
distance as they reflect the environment risks in the host countries. Government 
support and ownership type represent the home country institutional factors. 
Then, we examine the main effects of those institutional factors as well as the 
interactive effects between them. We argue that home government support and 
ownership type of firms not only affect the entry modes choice by changing the 
risk tolerance of the decision makers of the firms but also moderate the effect of 
the host institutional factors. Meanwhile, although firms from emerging market 
economies may enjoy advantages in cheap labor force and resources, they often 
lack world-class technology and innovation ability. Thus, the licensing mode for 
outward investment is almost non-existent. In this study, we will not consider 
licensing but focus on the choice between the equity-based modes (JV and WOS) 
and non-equity-based mode (export). 
Extant studies from the perspective of institutional factors largely focus on 
three main contents: institutional quality, institutional profile and culture 
distance. Institutional quality refers to the institutional factors which can support 
an effective market mechanism or not (North, 1990; Peng, 2008; Meyer et al. 
2009). These factors include some market-supporting factors, for example, 
government stability, socio-economic conditions, investment conflict, property 
rights, and information systems (Meyer et al. 2009; Busse and Hefeker, 2007).  
Institutional profile includes various aspects of the cross-country factors as 
cultural norms, social knowledge, rules and regulations and others. Based on 
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Scott’s (1995) three pillars of institutional environments—regulatory, cognitive, 
and normative, Kostova (1997) further introduced the concept of a three 
dimensional country institutional profile to explain how a country ‘s government 
policies (constituting a regulatory dimension), widely shared social knowledge (a 
cognitive dimension), and value systems (a normative dimension) affect 
domestic business activity (Busenitz et al.2000).  
Culture distance belongs to the institutional profile, but measures the 
difference between the host country and home country and has been adopted by 
some researchers. Culture distance has been used to represent the institutional 
profile several times in the previous literature about the location-specific factors 
(Dunning, 1993; Tihanyi et al.2005). Cultural context is thought to be helpful in 
defining profit potentials and/ or the risks associated with a specific entry mode 
(Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000). Most of the studies of cultural distance are 
based on Hofstede’s (1980) culture dimensions, but with some inconsistent 
results. Some studies have indicated a negative relationship between cultural 
distance and MNE performance (e.g., Luo and Peng, 1999), while other studies 
have found a positive effect (e.g., Morosini et al., 1998). However, culture 
distance surely should have some effects on the entry modes choice, especially 
for the countries with deep cultural background as China (Pan and Tse, 2000). 
Thus, in our study, we focus on institutional quality and cultural distance as two 
host institutional factors. 
Until now, most studies on institutional factors have emphasized the 
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attributes of the host countries, and neglected the role of the home-country based 
institutional factors. Although some studies mention the effect of government 
support on the entry modes choice, most of them are based on the government 
support in the host countries. There has been no comprehensive effort to examine 
the role of government from the home countries. Our study will elaborate the 
effect of host country government support on entry mode choice. 
Moreover, the traditional international business research has not paid much 
attention to ownership types (i.e., state versus private). This is not surprising 
because private ownership tends to be norm in these economies (Peng et al. 
2004). Ownership type, however, has become increasingly important when the 
research expanded to emerging economies (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Peng, 2000); 
especially as the effect of ownership type on the management strategy in these 
economies has some notable difference and characteristics. Thus, in our study, 
government support and ownership type serve as home institutional factors.  
In summary, this study takes into account both of the host country and home 
country institutional factors and also their interactive effects on the foreign 
market entry modes of EMMNCs (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1 
3.1.1 Institutional Quality 
Borrmann et al. (2005) claimed that institutional quality results from the 
efficiency of the rules of economic interaction and the effectiveness of their 
enforcement. In any given country environment, the institutional arrangements 
would be “strong” if they support the voluntary exchanges underpinning an 
effective market (Meyer et al. 2001). Conversely, the institutions are “weak” if 
they fail to ensure effective market or even undermine the market (e.g., corrupt 
business practices). High quality institutions promote larger scale project and use 
more efficient technologies. It increases productivity, improves competitiveness, 
facilitates structural change and contributes to a better division of labour in the 
national and international context (Borrmann et al., 2005) 
North (1990) suggested that institutional theory must be combined with 
transaction cost theory because institutions provide the structure in which 
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transactions occur. Thus, from the transaction cost perspective, the institutional 
quality of a target country influences foreign entrants’ mode decisions by 
moderating the costs of alternative organizational forms. High institutional 
quality help to decrease various costs in international transaction processes, such 
as the cost of monitoring, managing and inspecting performance, which are often 
associated the equity-based modes of overseas investment. Hill, Hwang, and Kim 
(1990) argue that firms can incur lower transaction costs by utilizing lower 
ownership modes in host countries with greater political risk and uncertainty. 
When there is a low institutional quality, because the lack of information for the 
target country with great market risk and uncertainty, firms should avoid taking 
the equity modes in case of the high transaction cost, such as the monitoring cost 
and the enforcement cost. Overall, everything else being equal, strong 
institutional frameworks lowers the costs of doing business, albeit making the 
equity modes for attractive for EMMNCs. However, institutional environment 
has also received much attention in conceptual and empirical studies of entry 
mode choice. From the environment risk perspective, high institutional quality 
may decrease the perceived risk of the decision makers of firms.  
Anderson and Gatignon (1986) argued that in more externally uncertain and 
volatile environments firms are better off utilizing low control ownership modes 
(e.g., joint ventures instead of wholly-owned subsidiaries) because of the 
increased flexibility provided to the firm. Based on the data from of 31 
developing countries, Jun and Singh (1996) find that political risks significantly 
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affect entry modes of firms and that countries with higher political risks attract 
less FDI. Lower corruption and nationalization risks and better contract 
enforcement can lead to higher FDI inflows. Furthermore, environment stability 
decreases the perceived risks of investors (Gastanaga et al. 1998). Too much 
change in institutional arrangements creates chaos and may reduce the 
opportunity for organizational changes necessary to compete effectively in 
foreign markets, making equity-based modes more risky and costly. When a host 
country has low institutional quality, firms react to such volatility by avoiding 
ownership and attempt to retain flexibility and shift risk to outsiders. Therefore, 
compared with equity-based entry modes, the non-equity-based entry modes as 
export would be preferred in countries of low institutional quality, and vice versa. 
Hypothesis 1: The higher institutional quality a host country has, the more 
favorable the equity modes (JV and WOS) are as opposed to the non-equity 
mode (export) in foreign market entry. 
3.1.2 Cultural Distance 
Cultural distance indicates the differences in cultural institutions between a 
home country and each target country (Kogut & Singh 1988). Cultural 
differences play a major role in increasing or decreasing managerial effectiveness 
in using firm-specific advantages at a foreign location (Hofstede 2001). However, 
there have been two opposing views about the effect of cultural distance on the 
entry modes choice. One stream of literature posits that greater cultural distance 
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between the home and the foreign market leads to a higher level of equity 
ownership in a firm's entry mode choice (Root, 1987; Davidson and McFeteridge, 
1985; Tihanyi et al. 2005). This positive relationship between cultural distance 
and equity investment is based on the perspective of control and transaction cost. 
Because cultural distance leads to greater information asymmetry and thus 
increases the costs of information and monitoring, firms prefer equity entry 
modes for exerting greater control in order to minimize transaction costs. From 
transaction cost theory, internalization is preferred when the firms are likely to 
take advantage of limited knowledge and assets and when future transaction 
contingencies could not be specified because of uncertainty or complexity 
(Williamson, 1975; Beamish and Banks, 1987). Thus, when the cultural distance 
is large, firms tend to choose the equity mode to absorb the external uncertainties 
through centralization of decision making, provide a reduction in transaction 
costs, and protect the firm from opportunistic behavior in the target country.  
Although control is an important consideration, entry mode choice in 
relationship to cultural distance can also be explained in the risk-reduction 
perspective. The other perspective argues conversely that there is a negative 
relationship between cultural distance and equity investment (Gatignon and 
Anderson 1988; Hill et al., 1990; Kim and Hwang, 1992; Nakos et al., 2002). 
This argument is based on the contingency approach, according to which a 
flexible organization will be better prepared to adapt to changing conditions 
(Lawrence and Lrosch, 1967). Under conditions of high cultural distance, firms 
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should restrict their resource commitment and thus reduce their risk exposure in 
these markets. In this case, MNCs may require greater flexibility, resulting in 
preferences for modes of entry with lower control such as export. Moreover, 
from Hennart and Larimo (1998), as the degree of cultural distance increases, the 
firm’s acquisition of local knowledge through local experience becomes more 
difficult and costly. The foreign investor is more likely to form a JV with less 
equity investment rather than the WOS to acquire local assets and knowledge. 
Given that firms from emerging markets often lack transaction-specific 
assets and technology advantages, we argue that the first theoretical perspective 
on minimizing the costs arising from cultural distance may not be applicable. 
First, firms lacking ownership advantages may not need more control to reduce 
the contractual risks as much as those with FSAs. Moreover, control is often 
based on the choice between JV and WOS, or between licensing and FDI. In this 
study, we focus on the choice between export and the equity entry modes. As a 
country of great cultural distance increases the transaction costs such as the 
information costs and monitoring costs, export should be preferred as it is less 
influenced by these factors. Thus, we propose that there is a negative relationship 
between cultural distance and equity investment. 
Hypothesis 2: The lower cultural distances there is between the host country 
and home, the more favorable the equity modes (JV and WOS) are as opposed to 
the non-equity mode (export) in foreign market entry. 
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3.1.3 Home Government Support 
Government support has been regarded as one of the influential institutional 
factors in studies of entry mode choices. Overall, a positive relationship has been 
found between government support and equity investment overseas (Hitt et al. 
2004). Most of the studies, however, focused on the government policies and 
incentives in the host countries and have not paid sufficient attention to the role 
of the home country government. The important role of selective policies for 
attracting the inward FDI, such as fiscal incentives and lower tariffs, has been 
examined in some extant studies (Pan and Tse, 2000). As EMMNCs become 
more involved in overseas markets, however, home government bodies from 
these countries have provided various incentives and administrative mechanisms 
to encourage firms to move abroad for growth and expansion. Consequently, 
home government often plays a key role in outward FDI activities by providing 
favorable policies, financial support, and government connections in host 
countries. Yiu et al.(2007) pointed that in some emerging economies, firms have 
to seek for government approval when they plan to establish foreign ventures. 
For instance, Okuda (1994) found that the trade and FDI policies in Taiwan had 
changed in two decades and analyzed the important effect of home government 
support for the trade situation of Taiwan. 
Over the past years, China has been regarded as the hotbed in attracting 
foreign investment. Nonetheless, by the rapid growth of FDI outflows, Chinese 
firms had invested a total of 100 billion abroad by 2010 (UNCTAD, 2010). In 
 43
China, the government has launched a "going out" campaign since 2003 to steer 
firms' outward movement in the pursuit of advanced technologies, R&D 
capabilities, or strategic assets such as brands and distribution channels. For 
example, in Guangdong Province of China, government even subsidizes 
companies in their visits to the developed countries to study the business 
practices and to enhance their R&D capabilities. Deng (2007) summarized that 
there are two significant and distinct features for Chinese outward FDI: the 
critical role of the Chinese government support and the increasing use of merges 
and acquisitions as a mode of entry. Institutional links are especially important in 
China, where there is deep involvement of the government in directing outward 
FDI (Cai, 1999). The motivation of the policymakers is not restricted to the sales 
of products but also pursuit of strategic asset and technical collaboration. 
Non-equity mode as export cannot satisfy the growth for EMMNCs to compete 
in global market. Overall, government support not only provides the incentives 
for firm's outward movement but also helps lower the perceived environmental 
risks and boost the confidence of firms in their overseas investment activities and 
in the pursuit of greater control in foreign market entry. Therefore, government 
support from the home country should have a positive effect on the equity-based 
entry modes: 
Hypothesis 3: Firms with government support in the home country are more 
likely to adopt the equity modes (JV and WOS) as opposed to non-equity mode 
(export) when entering foreign markets. 
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3.1.4 Ownership Type 
For the internationalization in developed economies, the previous studies 
traditionally have not paid much attention to ownership issues (i.e., state-owned 
versus private firms). This is not surprising because private ownership tends to be 
the norm in the developed economies. However, as the studies have expanded to 
emerging economies (Hoskisson et al. 2000; Peng, 2000), ownership has become 
an increasingly important issue, generating a growing literature which examines 
the effects of ownership on internationalization from organizational perspectives 
(Zahra et al. 2000). 
In emerging market economies, firms with different ownership arrangements 
vary greatly in (dis)advantages as a result of variation of institutional constraints 
across the types of enterprises (Zhou & van Witteloostuijn 2010). For instance, 
officially, as defined in Table 3, Chinese enterprises include state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), collective owned enterprises(COEs), mixed enterprises 
(MEs), foreign owned enterprises (FOEs), joint ventures (JVs) and domestic 
private owned enterprises (POEs). 
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Table 3 Officially defined ownership types in China 
Ownership Type Definition 
SOE State-owned enterprises. Enterprises owned by the central government. 
The government is responsible for appointing managers and the 
performances of firms. 
COE Collective-owned enterprises. Enterprises owned by local 
governments. For example, township and village enterprises are 
collective-owned enterprises. 
ME Mixed enterprises. Newly privatized enterprises in which government 
holds certain percentage of shares while the rest of the shares are held 
by private shareholders. 
FOE Wholly foreign-owned enterprises, including enterprises owned by 
overseas Chinese. 
JV Joint ventures, including joint ventures between foreign firms and 
Chinese SOEs, foreign firms and Chinese COEs, and foreign firms and 
domestic private firms. 
POE Domestic private-owned enterprises, including sole proprietorships 
and partnerships. 
Source: Z. Wei et al., Journal of Multinational Financial Management. 12 (2002) 
p: 61-78 
In our study, because of the blurring boundary between collectively owned, 
privately owned, and foreign-invested firms (including those from Hong Kong, 
Macro and Taiwan) in terms of the degree of privatization, we categorize these 
three ownership types as non-state owned, in contrast to state owned. In our 
study, we focus on the distinction between state-owned and non-state-owned 
firms. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) enjoy greater government support than 
private firms. Most SOEs rely on the state as their primary banker, supplier, and 
distributor, although vigorous measures are now being undertaken to push at 
least some of them to the market domain (Steinfeld, 1998). They are often the 
beneficiaries of government protection and less subject to market competition. In 
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contrast, non-state-owned firms do not have these advantages and operate more 
under the principles of market economy without the various resource 
endowments, thus are more risk aversive and conservative. Moreover, SOEs are 
often much bigger firms and have a longer operating history. In fact, large SOEs 
account for a overwhelming majority of the total outward FDI from China. Up to 
2006, the proportion of the outward FDI made by the SOEs is as high as 81%, 
and the top ten enterprises based on the overseas asset holdings are all SOEs. 
While benefiting the most from government support, SOEs also suffer from the 
bureaucratic mentality and a culture of dependency, soft budget constraint, as 
well as lack of management autonomy (Wilkinson et al. 2006). Meanwhile, they 
are expected to be more responsive to government agenda, including that of 
"going out," and often less concerned with the transaction costs in international 
business and the efficiency in capital utilization. Therefore, we hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 4: SOEs are more likely to adopt the equity modes (JV and 
WOS) than non-state-owned enterprises when entering foreign markets.  
3.1.5 Interactive Effects of Institutional Factors 
As we mentioned above, a firm will face dual risks when entering the 
foreign market. On one hand, there are contractual risks with high transaction 
cost for the firms with transaction-specific assets and ownership advantages 
when they become involved in international transactions. On the other hand, 
there are environmental risks when firms enter an unfamiliar market. However, 
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as a country without the transaction-specific assets and technology advantages, 
the environmental risks would be more important when making an entry mode 
decision. The attitude of firms towards the environmental risks and the 
corresponding mode they choose depend on their level of risk tolerance. 
Investor’s risk tolerance in the previous literature refers to the maximum amount 
of investment risk someone is comfortable taking (Schaefer, 1978). Thus, the risk 
tolerance in our study would refers to the maximum amount of investment risk a 
firm is capable of taking.  
We have already discussed the host country factors in perspective of 
institutional quality and culture distance, which are regarded as the measurement 
of the environment risk in the target country. Then we further argue the effect of 
host country factors on the entry modes decision is moderated by the home 
country factors through changing the risk tolerance level of firms. First, we argue 
that the home government support moderates the effect of host institutional 
factors on the entry modes of firms. Despite the high transaction costs and 
greater risks caused by low institutional quality and cultural distance, firms with 
greater home government support are likely to have a higher level of risk 
tolerance. These firms are to be “cushioned” when they “fall”. In a way, 
collectivism acts as implicit mutual insurance against catastrophic losses. This is 
why members from strong social collectives will, quite accurately, perceive the 
hazards of risky options to be smaller (Weber & Hsee 1998). In China, the 
government is similar to a timely “helper” to the firms and hence boosts their 
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confidence in adopting the equity modes in foreign market entry. Therefore, 
facing the environment risks due to the host institutional factors, firms with 
greater home government support would have higher risk tolerance and are more 
likely to choose the aggressive mode of foreign market entry. These firms would 
be less prudent than they should be in taking on the environmental risks, because 
they believe that, if they fail, the government will bail them out of difficult 
situations.  
Second, when facing the different level of environment risks in a target 
market, some Chinese firms would have high risk tolerance (more risk-seeking) 
and lead to moral hazard. Moral hazard is a pervasive feature of insurance and 
other forms of risk sharing. It arises when the provision of insurance increases 
the probability of the event being insured against, usually because it diminishes 
the incentives for the insured party to take preventive actions. Any insurance 
entails moral hazard when the behavior of the insured party can influence the 
probability of the event insured against and there is either asymmetric 
information or some other reason the insurer cannot respond fully (by adjusting 
terms or canceling coverage) to behavior that leads to an increase in the event’s 
probability (Lane and Phillips, 2000). In our study, the insuring party would be 
the government who is sharing the risk of the Chinese firms. The reason that lead 
to this behavior and increase the probabilities of moral hazard would be 
information asymmetry, in that the government overweigh the ability of the firms 
and their investing strategies. Moreover, it is necessary for Chinese firms to 
 49
select partners with capabilities that are complementary to their technical and 
management experience defection. At last, firms in China often lack autonomy to 
some extent and have to resign to the wills of government. Firms receiving 
government support are viewed to help the government to realize its goals. For 
example, during the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake, many private firms benefiting 
from the government enthusiastically donated money to alleviate the burden of 
government. Government would try its best to support the firms to achieve its 
own goals. Therefore, as there is support by the other party, the moral hazard is 
prone to happen. For example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been 
criticized for its lending practices and having contributed to the spreading of 
financial crises in emerging markets. Because after the economic crisis, the 
official international support to assist emerging market countries facing external 
payments difficulties induces these countries and their private creditors to be less 
prudent than they should be in taking on risks (Mussa, 2004). In our study, 
Chinese firms would be also less prudent than they should be in taking on the 
environmental risks, because they believe that, if they fail, the government will 
help to bail them out of their difficulties. In other words, Chinese firms would 
have higher risk tolerance when entering the foreign market under the support of 
the government. Therefore, we argue that even though there are high 
environmental risks in a host country; Chinese firms would still choose some 
risky modes (equity modes) because of their high risk tolerance. 
 Last, in the drive toward internationalization, the home country 
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governments often act as the champion for these home-grown multinationals. 
They often serve the agent or promoter of these firms, for instance, by leading 
investment tours, building business and government connections, offering 
language training and cultural immersion programs, providing market research 
and other types of services. In other words, government support helps to mitigate 
the environment risks in the host countries and minimize the effect of cultural 
distance. Firms under the auspices and support of home government are often 
better received and treated in the host countries.     Therefore, when there are 
great environmental risks in the host country, whether it is due to institutional 
quality or cultural distance, firms with greater support from the home 
government would be more ready to adopt the more risky equity modes of entry 
as compared with those without government support. 
Hypothesis 5: The positive effect of institutional quality in the host country 
on the adoption of equity modes of entry is greater for firms with government 
support than those without such support.   
Hypothesis 6: The negative effect of cultural distance on the adoption of 
equity modes of entry is smaller for firms with government support than those 
without such support. 
Likewise, the ownership type of firms also moderates the effect of host 
institutional factors on the entry mode of firms. Firms with different types of 
ownership may vary in their resources and abilities to deal with environment 
uncertainties in foreign markets. As state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are often 
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larger firms, have more experiences, and are more resourceful, hence less 
concerned with environmental uncertainty in the overseas markets. Moreover, 
while SOEs also enjoy greater government support and preferential policies, they 
are also more responsive to government agenda on the internationalization of 
firms as compared with private firms. Thus, SOEs have greater ability to cope 
with the environment risks in overseas markets and are less subject to the 
institutional constraints in overseas markets. In contrast, private firms are often 
smaller and less resourceful in dealing environmental uncertainty in overseas 
markets. Meanwhile, since many private firms are stock-ownership companies 
and are responsible to multiple stakeholders, they are more concerned with risks 
associated with overseas investment, costs of equity investment, and challenges 
of operating across national boundaries. Thus, non-state-owned firms should be 
more subject to the institutional constraints in a host country characterized by 
low institutional quality and/or great cultural distance. Therefore, ownership type 
of firms can significantly moderate the influence of the host institutional factors 
on the entry mode of firms expanding overseas.  
Hypothesis 7: The positive effect of institutional quality in the host country 
on the adoption of equity modes of entry is greater for SOEs than 
non-state-owned firms. 
Hypothesis 8: The negative effect of cultural distance on the adoption of 
equity modes of entry is greater for SOEs than non-state-owned firms.  
3.2 Investment Type and Entry Mode Choice 
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3.2.1 Main effect of Investment Types  
MNCs make different types of investment in foreign countries, and 
investment type influences the entry mode choice (Caves, 1971; Han, 2002; 
Mattoo, Olarreaga & Saggi, 2004). To explain the effect of investment type on 
entry mode choice, we would only focus on the equity mode choice between the 
internalizing activities (wholly owned subsidiaries) and the externalizing 
activities (joint ventures), leaving the mode of export aside. There are mainly 
three types of investment, likely R&D, market-seeking, as well as manufacturing. 
These three types are differentiated by R&D intensity, with R&D investment 
having the highest R&D intensity and sales divisions the lowest one. Many 
researchers have examined the relationship between R&D intensity and entry 
mode (Han, 2002). The major rationale for an entry strategy in the context of 
R&D intensity is whether or not the company should internalize the R&D 
activities based on risk analysis. MNCs increasingly have moved their R&D 
operations to absorb talent and ideas from overseas. But R&D activities face 
uncertainty and misappropriability hazards (Gambardella, 1995). MNCs with 
high technology products always prefer wholly owned subsidiaries to joint 
venture because they have no need for local partners to add local inputs and they 
fear the loss of quality, control, technological information, and monopoly profits 
which might occur if they form joint ventures with local business (Wells, 1973). 
Thus, companies tend to internalize their R&D activities to alleviate the 
uncertainty from the perspective of risk aversion. For example, in biotechnology 
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R&D investment, in-house R&D project can prohibit the team members from 
leaking know-how to competitors (Pisano, 1990). In contrast, if R&D project is 
carried at a different location, the risks of leakage would increase. Even if the 
contractual restrictions on transferring knowledge can be designed ex ante, it is 
hard to safeguard the R&D output, and enforcement is rather problematic. 
Consequently, as the misappropriability hazard would arise, MNCs prefer wholly 
owned subsidiaries when entering foreign markets in R&D operations. Although 
China has always been regarded as the “world factory” with a short history for 
the R&D investment abroad, there have been more and more R&D investment 
and products with high technologies in recent years, such as Lenovo’s R&D 
center in North Carolina in U.S.A. 
In contrast, if the investment is low in R&D intensity, like market-seeking in 
host country, these risks would be much lower. The investment in market-seeking 
always has the undifferentiated products without technological advantage. Also 
from Vernon’s IPLC theory, the production is moved to the foreign markets when 
the products become mature enough. The investors may go abroad to seize the 
low price resources and explore the new market. Thus, compared with protecting 
the specific assets and essential technologies, the local information would be 
more important for those investors because it is not necessary to hold much more 
control rights. It is better for them to acquire the knowledge of local markets, the 
economic environment, political regulations, raw materials sources and 
distribution channels by forming joint ventures with local partners. 
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At last, for the manufacturing investment, even it belongs to the investment 
type which has low R&D intensity as well; there is a slight difference from the 
market-seeking investment type. Since China has always been regarded as the 
manufacturing country and the FDI inward attractive hot land, it has a long 
history for products manufacturing, such as in the mode of OEM. China has the 
advantage of cheap resources and lots of experience for operating manufacturing 
business. Even when facing a new foreign market, Chinese firms are more likely 
to choose the wholly-owned subsidiary rather than joint venture for two reasons. 
On one hand, Chinese firms can do the job well without forming joint ventures 
with local partners because of their abundant experience of taking manufacturing 
business. They more tend to hold whole control rights and increase the flexibility 
in the foreign market. On the other hand, even Chinese firms go to the less 
developed countries for searching the resources even cheaper than in China, the 
poor institutional quality in those countries would have smaller effects on the 
entry mode because they have the experience of operating in Third World 
countries and quite familiar with the ways to cope with the pool institutional 
quality countries.  
Therefore, in perspective of assets protection, risk aversion and the 
experience of Chinese firms, we propose the investment type should have 
influence on the entry mode choice in that:  
Hypothesis 9a: Firms making R&D investment prefer internalizing activities 
(wholly owned subsidiaries) to externalizing activities (joint ventures). 
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Hypothesis 9b: Firms making market-seeking investment prefer joint ventures to 
wholly owned subsidiaries.  
Hypothesis 9c: Firms making manufacturing investment prefer wholly owned 
subsidiaries to joint ventures. 
3.2.2 The Effect of Institutional Factors in a Certain Investment Type 
The firm’s location and control decisions are both determined by the 
interrelation between the cost of executing these value-adding activities in 
various locations, knowledge flow costs between these activities (Buckley & 
Carter, 2004; Kogut & Zander, 1993; Martin & Salomon, 2003) and the cost of 
product flows to the market. Buckley and Hashai (2005) claimed that the location 
decision is where to locate each value-adding activity so that the overall costs are 
minimized. Based on transaction cost theory, firms making R&D investment are 
holding some specific assets and prefer to locate the new products in their own 
country or the countries with technology advantages. Moreover, for many 
EMMNCs, overseas investment or internationalization is not the end, but the 
means to acquire strategic assets and proprietary knowledge, especially R&D 
capabilities. Since such capabilities cannot be developed within over a short 
period, EMMNCs often invest in overseas R&D operations to upgrade their 
technology and product capabilities (Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Deng, 2007). 
Thus, R&D opportunities are more often available in advanced economies than 
in LDCs. Followed by Vernon’s IPLC theory, firms making market-seeking 
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investment abroad are holding the mature products. To be closer to a broad 
customer group and avoid the trade barriers, firms tend to establish marketing 
divisions in the advanced countries rather than LDCs to better serve those 
comparably “richer” foreign customers. As for the manufacturing investment, 
according to the product cycle framework, the relative importance of R&D and 
knowledge flow costs would decline over time; it’s generally believed that firms 
making manufacturing investment prefer to go to LDCs to acquire cheap nature 
or labor resources. Thus, based on Buckley’s framework, the relationship 
between investment types and location choice could be summarized in Table 4: 
Table 4: Investment Type and Location Choice 
Activities/Country Marketing Production R&D 
LDCs 
(resource-rich) 
- + - 
DC + - + 
However, we find the results for Chinese firms are not quite consistent with 
Buckley’s framework by using our data of 314 Chinese multinationals. As China 
is one of the largest newly industrialized economies, in our model, we classify 
the locations into Developed Countries, Newly Industrialized Economies and 
Less Developed Countries. Based on the results in Table 5, among Chinese firms 
that have set up OFDI operations in R&D in overseas markets, nearly half of 
them have done so in developed countries (48.4%). These results are consistent 
with the traditional arguments that Chinese firms have looked to the advanced 
economies as a major avenue for Chinese firms to acquire new technologies for 
production and products. Among Chinese firms that have set up OFDI operations 
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in market-seeking in overseas markets, majority of the firms have established this 
type of operation in developed countries (46.3%), but not significantly more than 
in newly industrialized economies and the less developed countries (24.1% and 
29.6% respectively) (Table 6). As for the FDI projects in manufacturing 
established by Chinese firms overseas, also the majority of them are in 
economically developed nations (44.6%), significantly much more so than in 
newly industrialized economies and the less developed countries (22.8% and 
32.6% respectively), indicating that Chinese firms also prefer to pursue the 
production opportunities in the economically more advanced markets which is 
quite inconsistent with Buckley’s framework (Table 7). 
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 Thus, to enrich the “economic school” in IB research and for better 
explanation of entry strategy for Chinese multinationals, we further argue that 
investment types are intertwined with institutions (Caves, 1971; Han, 2002; 
Mattoo et al., 2004). We expect some interactive effect between institutional 
factors and investment types in terms of their effects on entry modes.  
For the home institutional factors, i.e. government support and ownership 
type, as we explained before, even though there are great environmental risks in 
the host country; firms with greater support from the home government would be 
more ready to adopt the more risky equity modes of entry as compared with 
those without government support. Even the Chinese enterprises with their own 
specific assets or advanced technologies are concerned with leaking 
technological information and thus resist forming joint ventures with local firms; 
this kind of fear and risk could be reduced by the home government support. The 
government support, once again, become the “big cushion” as a way of risk 
aversion when the firms face the potential risk of knowledge know-how loss. 
Moreover, because SOEs have greater ability to cope with the environment risks 
in overseas markets and are less subject to the institutional constraints in 
overseas markets. There is the same reason for the risk sharing by the 
state-owned enterprises. 
R&D investment has long been considered as a very important stimulus for 
the economics development. Government would provide essential financial 
support and policies favorable for the R&D investment. In recent years, Chinese 
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government has made lots of preferential policies to encourage the firms’ R&D 
investment abroad since the “go-global” strategy was issued. China has been 
trying to shake off the title of “world factory” and make some products with its 
own technologies. Some big multinationals, as Huawei, Haier and Lenovo, were 
supported to have built R&D centers in the foreign market a few years ago. More 
and more enterprises, especially for the SOEs, have begun to take R&D 
investment abroad by mergence and acquisitions or joint ventures with foreign 
local business, such as China Telecom. Therefore, we argue that firms making 
R&D investment abroad would be influenced by the home institutional factors, 
i.e. government support and ownership type in that: 
Hypothesis 10: Firms making R&D investment with government support 
prefer externalizing activities (joint ventures) to internalizing activities (wholly 
owned subsidiaries) than those without such support.  
Hypothesis 11: SOEs making R&D investment prefer externalizing 
activities (joint ventures) to internalizing activities (wholly owned subsidiaries) 
than non-state-owned firms. 
For the host institutional factors, previous studies have focused on host 
country’s institutions and R&D investment (Han, 2002; Leahy & Naghavi, 2006; 
Naghavi & Leahy, 2008). The major rationale is that R&D intensive activities are 
sensitive to the mechanism of intellectual property protection (IPP). The 
mechanism of IPP plays an important role in the decision making of entry mode 
because company’s competitive advantages increasingly come from 
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knowledge-based assets. As these assets can be copied by the competitors, firms 
rely on regulatory regimes to protect their knowledge-based assets and to 
maintain their competition advantage. However, not all countries have a strong 
IPP regime. In some countries piracy and infringement are rampant and the 
intellectual property can not be effectively protected. MNCs then protect their 
intellectual property by themselves, and also by internalizing R&D activities 
(Leahy & Naghavi, 2006; Maskus, 1998; Naghavi & Leahy, 2008). When the 
mechanism of IPP is strong, MNCs may be willing to adopt joint ventures for 
R&D activities. When such a regime is weak, the obvious choice is to take the 
WOS mode for R&D investment (Leahy & Naghavi, 2006; Naghavi & Leahy, 
2008). The high institutional quality indicates a good investment environment, 
and thus a comparably strong IPP mechanism. 
Furthermore, Liu (2009) claimed that the outward R&D investment for 
Chinese firms could be divided into three types which are Applied R&D 
Investment, Basic R&D investment and Learning R&D investment. Applied 
R&D Investment is the combination of existing technical resource of Chinese 
firms and the information in foreign local market. This kind of investment would 
not reinforce the core technology of Chinese firms, but localize the technology 
and improve the product competitiveness in the local market. Basic R&D 
investment is a way to improve firms’ existing technology by exploiting foreign 
local basic technology and R&D resources which include local talent, low talent 
cost or the other low R&D cost. Learning R&D investment is to build R&D 
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center in the developed countries, learn and monitor the latest innovation 
information and trend. It’s not necessary for those R&D center to do some 
R&D work, but search and collect the latest trend in related areas in advanced 
countries. China has a very short history of outward R&D investment and most 
of Chinese MNCs belong to the third group of R&D investment type. They are in 
the process of learning and gathering the latest R&D information in advanced 
countries. The high institutional quality and low cultural distance would decrease 
the marketing barrier and make them more easily to access to the true 
technological information in local market through the local partners. Thus when 
the investment environment is satisfactory i.e. the institutional quality is high and 
cultural distance is small between China and the target country, Chinese firms are 
more willing to form joint ventures with local entrepreneurs to learn and 
gathering the information when making the R&D investment. Therefore, we 
propose the host institutional factors would have influence on the firms making 
R&D investment in that: 
Hypothesis 12: The higher institutional quality a host country has, the more 
favorable the externalizing modes (joint ventures) are as opposed to the 
internalizing modes (wholly owned subsidiaries) for the firms are making R&D 
investment. 
Hypothesis 13: The lower cultural distances there is between the host 
country and home, the more favorable the externalizing modes (joint ventures) 
are as opposed to the internalizing modes (wholly owned subsidiaries) for the 
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firms are making R&D investment. 
Dunning (1993) argued that enterprises making investment to seek market in 
the foreign market through FDI for a variety of reasons: to expand the existing 
domestic buyer-supplier relationships in host countries; to avoid being preempted 
by the rivals’ entry into a particular host country; to produce products close to 
local markets; to lower transportation costs; and, to benefit from investment 
incentives. It is suggested that firms prefer to go to upstream countries 
(developed countries) to attract more high income customers for differentiated 
goods, and more likely to go to downstream countries (less developed countries) 
to attract low income customers for labor intensive goods (Makino, Lau and Yeh, 
2002). In perspective transaction cost theory, we argue in the last part that firms 
should fear the risk of technology loss when taking the R&D investment in the 
foreign market. In this case, government support and state-owned type may share 
the perceived risk of firms and increase the risk-aversion of them. For the 
market-seeking investment, however, risk of technology loss would not be 
important to this kind of situation. As for the current situation of Chinese 
industry status and products development, most firms making outward 
market-seeing investment should have the labor intensive goods which are 
mature enough. Therefore, it is difficult to suggest the effect of home institutional 
factors (government support and ownership type) on the entry modes for the 
market-seeking investment. 
For the host institutional factors, however, we argue that they should have 
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certain influence on the entry modes between joint ventures and wholly-owned 
subsidiaries. Firms exploring new market opportunities in a foreign country must 
tend to invest in countries where market potential is large than in countries with 
small market potential (Makino, Lau and Yeh, 2002). Lecraw (1991) also 
claimed that the rate of growth of domestic demand and changes in the tariff rate 
had a significant impact on market-seeking investment. When firms explore a 
new market abroad, the local economic and political environment should be the 
very important factors in consideration. Moreover, if Chinese firms need local 
information and local inputs, it’s easier for them to access to the information and 
communicate with the local business if there is small cultural distance between 
China and the host country. Therefore, we propose that the host institutional 
factors would have influence on the entry modes between JV and WOS for the 
market-seeking investment in that: 
Hypothesis 14: The higher institutional quality a host country has, the more 
favorable the externalizing modes (joint ventures) are as opposed to the 
internalizing modes (wholly owned subsidiaries) for the firms are making 
market-seeking investment. 
Hypothesis 15: The lower cultural distances there is between the host 
country and home, the more favorable the externalizing modes (joint ventures) 
are as opposed to the internalizing modes (wholly owned subsidiaries) for the 
firms are making market-seeking investment. 
For the last investment type, the manufacturing investment, we do not 
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consider the effects of home institutions for the same reason as the 
market-seeking investment. Most firms making outward manufacturing 
investment should have the labor intensive goods which are mature enough. 
Home institutional factors (government support and ownership type) may not 
have much effect on on the entry modes for the manufacturing investment. As for 
the host institutions, as we explain before, Chinese firms have special advantage 
in manufacturing investment because of their long term experience for doing that. 
Most of manufacturing investments take place in the less developed countries for 
their cheap labor and nature resources. First, Chinese firms are familiar with the 
Third World conditions and do not need local partners to provide local 
information. Moreover, most of the products are mature enough without new 
technology, thus it is not necessary for Chinese firms to have joint venture with 
local firms for technology learning or collaboration. Thus, it is quite different 
from R&D and market-seeking investment type. Chinese firms when investing in 
manufacturing are more likely to choose wholly-owned subsidiary and hold the 
whole control rights to increase the flexibility in the foreign market. When the 
institutional quality is high and cultural distance is low, the only thing the firms 
need to do is to take advantage of the cheap resources and making mass 
production in a good environment. Therefore, we propose that when there is high 
institutional quality and low cultural distance, Chinese firms more likely to 
choose WOS than JV. 
Hypothesis 16: The higher institutional quality a host country has, the more 
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favorable the internalizing modes (wholly owned subsidiaries) are as opposed to 
the externalizing modes (joint ventures) for the firms are making manufacturing 
investment. 
Hypothesis 17: The lower cultural distances there is between the host 
country and home, the more favorable the internalizing modes (wholly owned 
subsidiaries) are as opposed to the externalizing modes (joint ventures) for the 
firms are making manufacturing investment. 
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CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this part is to introduce the research methodologies used in 
this study. In this part, we present quantitative method. Quantitative research 
emphasizes the measurement and analysis of causal relationships between 
variables (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). The first part introduces the sample and 
questionnaire design. We conducted a questionnaire survey in mainland China in 
2010. The second part introduces the measures for the variables.  
4.1 The Survey and Questionnaire Design 
The data on firms' foreign market entry mode and their home institutional 
factors are collected through a survey of mainland Chinese firms. A major 
multinational research company was commissioned to conduct the survey using 
its proprietary panel of executives from 1,500 Chinese companies that had some 
international businesses in 2010. These companies come from four major 
manufacturing sectors, i.e. food and beverages, textile and apparel, electric 
machinery and electronics, and transportation and other equipment. Firms from 
sectors in natural resources, finance, banking, and business services were 
excluded because their outward FDI often reflects government agenda rather than 
firm behavior.  
The lack of generalizability may happen as a result of coverage bias, 
selection bias, and non-response bias. Thus, generalizability of resultant findings 
to represent the population it represents is taken into consideration in sample 
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design. Blair and Zinkhan (2006) suggest that, instead of attempting to justify the 
results by comparing non-respondents with the broader population on a few 
demographic variables, or by comparing early versus late respondents, 
researchers are encouraged to maximize response rates as much as possible 
through careful survey design. The best practices to maximize response rate 
involves (1) preparing attractive questionnaire and cover letter, (2) identifying 
proper respondents, (3) contacting with proper respondents to inform the coming 
survey, (4) following up, and finally, (5) if the respondent rate is still low, doing 
extra efforts to compare non-respondent sample with respondent sample, 
checking if any differences exists between these two samples on demographic 
aspects or key attributes (Blair & Zinkhan, 2006; Dillman, 2000). 
To minimize the effects of common method variance, the procedures 
suggested by Podsakoff, Mackenzie, and Lee (2003) are followed to design the 
questionnaire. Firstly, we carefully construct the items in English and then 
translate them into Chinese to make them as simple, specific and concise as 
possible. Comprehension problems caused by item complexity or ambiguity 
induce respondents to develop their own idiosyncratic meanings for items, which 
may result in common method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Lee, 2003; 
Tourangeau, Rasinski, & D’ Andrade, 1991). Item wording and terminology in 
Chinese were refined accordingly to ensure the validity and appropriateness of 
the measures in China context. Moreover, scale anchors for different constructs 
vary from one to another (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Lee, 2003). For some 
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constructs in our study (e.g. government support), the scale is consisting of 
7-point Likert-type indicators, ranging from 0 “none” to 6 “much more”. 
However, some other constructs adopt different anchors for scales. For example, 
the scale of product standardization consists in 7-point Likert-type indicators, 
ranging from 1 “strongly disagree” to 7 “strongly agree”.  At last, respondents 
were convinced in advance about the following messages. (1) The information 
collected is only for academic usage. (2) There is no right or wrong answer. What 
respondents need to do is to answer questionnaires as honestly as possible. (3) 
Respondent anonymity is protected.  
The questionnaires were delivered to the top executives at these companies 
who were familiar with their international operations. After two weeks, follow-up 
phone calls and email reminders were to those panelists who have not responded. 
Finally, 314 completed questionnaires were collected, resulting in a response rate 
of 21%. At the end of the survey, research assistants placed phone calls to 10% of 
respondents randomly to verify their identity and responses to the survey. The 
data about the host country's national institutions are collected through PRS 
Group’s International Country’s Risk Guide (www.prsgroup.com), which 
provides measures of a country’s institutional quality (Dikova et al. 2010). The 
political risk of PRS Group is measured by 12 items, i.e. government stability, 
socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, external conflict, 
corruption, military in politics, religious tension, law and order, ethnic tensions, 
democratic accountability, and bureaucracy quality. 
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4.2 Measures 
4.2.1 Dependent Variable 
We use the entry mode as dependent variable. In part one, we focus on 
non-equity modes (export) vs. equity modes (FDI, including WOS and JV). If a 
firm adopts FDI modes when entering a foreign market, it is denoted as 1, while 
the export mode is denoted as 0. A particular company in foreign market may have 
two alternatives: export or equity mode, we just use equity mode as the dependent 
variable. Since a particular subsidiary may choose both export and equity mode in one 
market during a certain time, we specified in the questionnaire that the firm should 
indicate its latest investment mode choice if it is in this case. In part two, we 
focus on high equity mode (wholly-owned subsidiary) vs. low equity mode (joint 
venture) for FDI. If a firm adopts wholly-owned subsidiary when entering a 
foreign market in a specific investment type, it is denoted as 1, while the joint 
venture mode is denoted as 0. 
4.2.2 Government Support 
Then, the host and home country institutional factors are the independent 
variables. Home government support and ownership type are the indicators of 
home institutional factors. Governmental support is measured by five indicators: 
(1) Chinese government drew up a series of policies encouraging us to explore 
overseas markets; (2) Chinese government helped negotiating with host country 
governments when we encountered problems in overseas markets; (3) Chinese 
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government helps us to realize our goal in the host country through developing 
close relationships with local governments; (4) Chinese government helps us find 
appropriate projects in overseas markets; (5) Chinese government puts in place 
relevant policies to help us obtain financing with favorable terms for our 
overseas expansion. These items are measured in 7-Likert scale with 1 denoting 
the lowest and 7 the highest with a point of neutrality in the middle. The five 
items then are analyzed through factor analysis and achieve good conceptual 
validity. The resulting factor score is used to represent home government support. 
As for ownership type, SOEs with the government as the sole or the largest 
owner are denoted by 1 while private firms of various types are coded as 0. 
4.2.3 Ownership Type 
Ownership type is measured using a single item. The respondents were asked 
to indicate the type of ownership of the firms, whether they are state-owned, 
collectively owned, privately owned, Hong Kong-, Macro- and Taiwan-invested, 
or foreign invested. We then grouped collectively owned, privately owned, Hong 
Kong-, Macro- and Taiwan-invested, and foreign invested ones into one category, 
non-state owned. We coded state-owned firms as 1 and non-state owned as 0. 
4.2.4 Institutional Quality 
The host institutional factors include institutional quality and cultural 
distance. Institutional quality is measured using the data from the PRS Group 
International Country Risk Guide (Dikova et al. 2010). This guide measures the 
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composite country risks for foreign businesses, including both economic and 
politic risks. For the 25 countries in our study, we use their average score of 74 as 
the boundary. Countries with a risk score higher than 74 are deemed to have a 
good institutional quality and vice versa.  
4.2.5 Cultural Distance 
Cultural distance is measured by Hofstede’s five culture dimension scores: 
power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and long-term 
orientation (Hofstede 2001). Using these index scores can help avoid the 
problems of common method variance or retrospective evaluation of a national 
culture, which are often attributed to the same individuals answering questions 
about firm performance as well as those about national cultures. In this study, we 
use the multidimensional measure to arrive at the cultural distance between 
China and the other countries along Hofstede's five indices of cultural differences 
(Morosini et al. 1998): 
JCD 
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where jCD denotes the cultural distance for the jth country, ijI denotes 
Hofstede's culture score on ith cultural dimension in the jth country, and c in this 
case denotes the home country of China. 
4.2.6 Control Variables 
The control variables include industry category, firm age and firm size. We 
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include the dummy variables of three industries: 1) electric equipment and 
electronics, 2) food and beverages, and 3) textile and apparel (vs. others). Firm 
age is measured as the number of years since the beginning of its operations, 
while firm size is measured by the total number of employees. 
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CHAPTER 5. RESULTS 
Among the respondent firms, 52% of them are state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) while the rest of them are various types of private firms. Most of the 
firms come from manufacturing industries in electric and electronics (31.9%), 
machinery (14.6%), and textile and apparel (11.5%), with the remainder coming 
from other sectors. The number of employees among these firms ranges from 100 
to more than 100,000, thus representing firms of various sizes. On average, these 
firms have 33.2% of total sales from export, 23.9% of total sales from overseas 
subsidiaries (excluding export), and 25.6% of their total assets from overseas 
divisions. These companies' international business operations cover 25 host 
countries in different parts of the world. Altogether, they include 2,373 export 
entry modes and 1,071 cases of equity-based investment. Among 2,373 export 
cases, 50.4% of them are SOEs, and among 1,071 FDI cases, 54.7% are SOEs 
(Table 5). Table 6 includes the descriptive statistics and correlations of the key 
variables. Table 7 indicates the categorical variables. 
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Table 5 Investment type for SOEs 
 SOE 
Total Investment Type Non-SOE SOE 
Export Count 1178   1195 2373 
% within SOE 
 49.6% 
 
50.4% 
100% 
FDI Count 485 586 1071 
% within SOE 45.3% 54.7% 100% 
Total Count 1663 1781 3444 
% within SOE 48% 52% 100% 
 
 
 
Table 6 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Variables 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Entry mode .31 .46       
2. Govern support 4.27 1.01 .092**     
3. Ownership type 1.72 .79 -.025 -.101**     
4.Institutional quality 72.30 14.08 -.017 .000 .000    
5. Cultural distance 91.92 30.27 -.051** .039** -.024 .392**   
6. Firm size 3.69 1.19 -.002 .102 .139** .000 .003  
7. Firm age 10.74 14.86 .023 .033** -.282 .000 .200** .337
Note: *: p≤0.10, **: p≤0.05 and ***: p≤0.001 
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Table 7 Categorical Variables Codings 
  
Frequency  
Firm 
size 
100－499 人 31
500－999 人 207
1000-4999 人 187
5000-9999 人 39
10000－49999 人 25
50000－99999 人 11
10 万人以上 13
Industry Food 96
Textile&Apparel 113
Machinery 140
Transport&Comm
u 
26
Electronic & 
Electric 
138
5.1 Main Effects of Institutional Factors 
Using binary logistic regression with equity modes denoted by 1 and export 
denoted by 0, we first test the main effects of the host and home institutional 
factors on firms' probability to adopt the equity-based entry modes (JVs and 
WOS). The results of the main effects of variables are shown under Model 1 of 
Table 8. For the host country institutional factors, institutional quality has a 
significant positive effect on the equity mode (β=0.072, p≤0.001). This suggests 
that the higher institutional quality in the host country, the more likely are firms 
to adopt the equity modes (FDI). As expected, cultural distance has a small and 
significant negative effect on the equity entry mode (β= –0.010 p≤0.001). Thus, 
the smaller cultural distance there is between China and the host countries, the 
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more likely are firms to adopt the equity mode. For the home institutional factors, 
government support has a significant positive impact on the choice of equity 
modes among Chinese multinationals (β=0.650, p≤0.001). Meanwhile, 
ownership type firms (i.e., SOEs) also has a significant positive effect on the 
equity mode of entry (β=0.126, p≤0.1). Thus, the SOEs are more likely to adopt 
the equity modes (FDI) than private firms. 
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Table 8 Results of Logistic Regressions on the Choice of Equity Entry Modes  
Variables/Models Model 1 Model 2 
Control Variables   
 Firm size(1) -0.763** −0.756** 
Firm size(2) 0.104 0.105 
Firm size(3) -0.131 -0.130 
Firm size(4) 0.024 0.024 
Firm size(5) -0.214 -0.213 
Firm size(6) 1.304*** 1.300*** 
Industry (1) 0.151 0.148 
Industry (2) 0.094 0.092 
Industry (3) -0.569*** -0.569*** 
Industry (4) 0.007 0.005 
Firm age 0.002 0.002 
Host institutional factors   
 Institutional quality (IQ) 0.072*** 0.392** 
 Cultural distance (CD) −0.010*** -0.587*** 
Home institutional factors   
 Government support (GS) 0.650*** 0.249 
 Ownership type (OT: SOE) 0.126* -0.022 
Interactions   
 IQ*GS  0.481** 
 CD*GS  0.053 
 IQ*OT  0.305* 
 CD*OT  -0.167 
Note: *: p≤0.10, **: p≤0.05 and ***: p≤0.001 
5.2 Moderating Effects of Home Institutional Factors 
To examine the interactive effects among variables, we first conducted the 
collinearity diagnostics. The collinearity analysis shows that the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) values of variables range between 1.013 and 1.445, thus far 
below the critical value of 10, and show no problems with multi-collinearity 
among these variables. According to the results of model 2 in Table 8, the main 
effects of government support and ownership type are no longer significant once 
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the interactions of institutional factors are included. Thus, hypothesis 3 & 4 are 
no longer supported. This is perhaps because government support and ownership 
type alone do not have a significant influence on the entry modes choice. 
However, the main effects of institutional quality, cultural distance remain 
significant, thus furnishing support of hypotheses 1 and 2 (Table 8). 
Furthermore, from model 2 and the interaction plots (Figure2, 3, 4, 5), home 
government support has a significant interaction with host institutional quality in 
its effect the equity entry mode (β for IQ*GS = 0.481). Thus, the positive effect 
of institutional quality on the probability to adopt the equity modes is greater for 
firms with strong home government support than those lacking such support, thus 
H5 is supported. But the interaction effect between cultural distance and 
government support is not significant. This indicates that home government 
support can not significantly mitigate the negative effect of cultural distance on 
firms' probability to adopt the equity modes in foreign market entry. In other 
words, despite there is strong home government support, the cultural distance 
between China and the host country remains a barrier for firms adopting the 
equity modes (FDI), H6 is not supported (Figure3). This maybe because that 
China is a country with deep cultural background, the cultural difference is a 
very important factor when choosing entry modes for Chinese firms. The cultural 
distance is always a barrier for equity modes choice even the government would 
share the firms’ risk. 
Moreover, the interaction between institutional quality and ownership type is 
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also significant (β for IQ*OT = .305), supporting H7 and suggesting that SOEs 
tend to adopt the equity mode of entry when expanding in countries with a high 
level of institutional quality. However, the interaction between cultural distance 
and ownership type are not significant, thus H8 is not supported (Figure 5). This 
may be due to the fact that there is no significant difference between SOEs and 
private firms in the effect of cultural distance on the entry mode decisions or 
cultural distance affects their entry mode decisions in a similar way. 
  
Figure 2                                            Figure 3              
  
Figure 4                                                  Figure 5                
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5.3 Main Effects of Investment Type 
Using binary logistic regression with wholly-owned subsidiary denoted by 1 
and joint venture denoted by 0, we first test the main effects of investment type 
(R&D investment, market-seeking investment and manufacturing investment) on 
firms' probability to adopt the wholly-owned subsidiary mode. The results of the 
main effects of variables are shown under the first model in Table 9. For the 
R&D investment type, it has a significant positive effect on the WOS mode 
(β=0.481, p≤0.05). This suggests that firms making R&D investment are more 
likely to adopt the WOS mode. As expected, manufacturing investment also has a 
significant positive effect on the WOS mode (β=0.893, p≤0.001). Thus, firms 
making manufacturing investment are more likely to adopt WOS mode as well.  
However, for the market-seeking investment, there is no significant effect on the 
choice of JV mode, but has the right direction. H9a and H9c are supported but 
H9b is not. 
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Table 9 Results of Logistic Regressions on the Choice of WOS (Main Effects) 
Variables/Models R&D Investment 
Control Variables  
 Firm size(1) -0.181 
Firm size(2) -0.552 
Firm size(3) -0.360 
Firm size(4) -0.113 
Firm size(5) -0.664 
Firm size(6) 0.115 
Industry (1) 0.009 
Industry (2) 0.177 
Industry (3) -0.320 
Industry (4) 0.416** 
Firm age -0.005 
Investment Type  
 R&D (RD) 0.481** 
 Market-seeking (MS) -0.106 
Manufacturing (MF) 0.893*** 
Note: *: p≤0.10, **: p≤0.05 and ***: p≤0.001 
Table 10 Results of Logistic Regressions on the Choice of WOS (R&D 
Investment) 
Variables/Models R&D Investment 
Control Variables  
 Firm size(1) 0.314 
Firm size(2) -0.228 
Firm size(3) 0.327 
Firm size(4) -0.304 
Firm size(5) 1.982** 
Firm size(6) 1.207 
Industry (1) 0.034 
Industry (2) -0.538* 
Industry (3) -0.382 
Industry (4) -0.536 
Firm age 0.009 
Host institutional factors  
 Institutional quality (IQ) -0.063** 
 Cultural distance (CD) 0.002 
Home institutional factors  
 Government support (GS) 0.080 
 Ownership type (OT: SOE) -0.995*** 
Note: *: p≤0.10, **: p≤0.05 and ***: p≤0.001 
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Table 11 Results of Logistic Regressions on the Choice of WOS 
(Market-seeking and Manufacturing) 
Variables/Models Market-seeking 
Investment 
Manufacturing 
Investment 
Control Variables   
 Firm size(1) 0.529 -0.782 * 
Firm size(2) 0.578 -0.907** 
Firm size(3) 1.541** -0.427 
Firm size(4) 1.034* -0.867 
Firm size(5) 1.587 -0.192 
Firm size(6) 1.293* 0.112 
Industry (1) -0.388 -0.089 
Industry (2) -0.423 0.063 
Industry (3) -0.254 -0.568** 
Industry (4) -0.755 -0.483 
Firm age -0.003 -0.002 
Host institutional factors   
 Institutional quality (IQ) -0.059*** 0.028 * 
 Cultural distance (CD) 0.001 0.005 * 
Home institutional factors   
Government Support (GS) 0.895** 0.201 
Ownership Type (OT: SOE) -0.766*** -0.127 
Note: *: p≤0.10, **: p≤0.05 and ***: p≤0.001 
5.4 Effects of Institutional Factors in a Certain Investment Type 
To examine the interactive effects among variables, we first conducted the 
collinearity diagnostics. The collinearity analysis shows that the variance 
inflation factors (VIF) values of variables range between 1.018and 1.155, thus far 
below the critical value of 10, and show no problems with multi-collinearity 
among these variables. For the location choice in a certain investment type using 
the data of Chinese multinationals, we find the results (Table 12-14) are not quite 
consistent with Buckley’s location framework in table 4: 
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Table 12 OFDI in R&D by Country Type from Chinese Multinationals 
Country Type 
OFDI in R&D 
Total no yes 
Developed Countries Count 262 207 469 
% within OFDI in 
R&D 
44.9% 48.4% 46.4%
Newly Industrialized 
Economies 
Count 133 112 245 
% within OFDI in 
R&D 
22.8% 26.2% 24.2%
Less Developed Countries Count 188 109 297 
% within OFDI in 
R&D 
32.2% 25.5% 29.4%
Total 
Chi-square sig. < 0.1 
Count 583 428 1011 
% within OFDI in 
R&D 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Table 13 OFDI in Marketing by Country Type from Chinese 
Multinationals 
Country Type 
OFDI in 
Marketing 
Total no yes 
Developed Countries Count 217 252 469 
% within OFDI in Marketing 45.1% 46.3% 45.8%
Newly Industrialized 
Economies 
Count 115 131 246 
% within OFDI in Marketing 23.9% 24.1% 24.0%
Less Developed 
Countries 
Count 149 161 310 
% within OFDI in Marketing 31.0% 29.6% 30.2%
Total 
Chi-square sig. 0.884 
Count 481 544 1025 
% within OFDI in Marketing 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
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Table 14 OFDI in Production by Country Type from Chinese Multinationals 
Country Type 
OFDI in 
Production 
Total no yes 
Developed Countries Count 242 229 471 
% within OFDI in Production 48.0% 44.6% 46.3%
Newly Industrialized 
Economies 
Count 129 117 246 
% within OFDI in Production 25.6% 22.8% 24.2%
Less Developed 
Countries 
Count 133 167 300 
% within OFDI in Production 26.4% 32.6% 29.5%
Total 
Chi-square sig. < 0.1 
Count 504 513 1017 
% within OFDI in Production 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
For the R&D investment type, according to the results in Table 10, 
ownership type significantly has effect on the WOS entry mode choice for firms 
making R&D investment (β= -0.995). Thus, the negative effect shows that the 
probability to adopt the joint venture mode is greater for firms making R&D 
investment for SOEs than private firms, thus H11 is supported. But it’s not 
significant for the interaction effect between R&D investment type and 
government support. This indicates that there is no tendency for firms making 
R&D investment to adopt the joint venture mode in foreign market, even though 
the government could share the risk with them. It may be caused by technology 
collaboration, information approaching or other factors. H10 is not supported. 
Moreover, the interaction between institutional quality and R&D investment type 
is significant (β=-0.063), supporting H12 and suggesting that firms making R&D 
investment tend to adopt the joint venture mode of entry when expanding in 
countries with a high level of institutional quality. However, the interaction 
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between cultural distance and R&D investment type is not significant, thus H13 
is not supported. Cultural distance is still a barrier for the modes choice in R&D 
investment. 
For the market-seeking investment type, also according to the results in 
Table 11, we only focus on the interaction effect between host institutional 
factors and the market-seeking type on the WOS mode choice, the interaction 
between institutional quality and market-seeking investment type is significant 
(β=-0.059), supporting H14 and suggesting that firms making market-seeking 
investment tend to adopt the joint venture mode of entry when expanding in 
countries with a high level of institutional quality as well as firms making R&D 
investment. However, the interaction between cultural distance and 
market-seeking investment type remains not significant, thus H15 is not 
supported.  
At last, for the manufacturing investment (Table 11), as expected, the 
interaction between institutional quality and manufacturing investment type is 
significant (β=0.028), supporting H16. The positive relationship suggest that 
firms making manufacturing investment tend to adopt the wholly-owned 
subsidiary mode of entry when expanding in countries with a high level of 
institutional quality. However, the effect of cultural distance has the opposite 
direction as expected, H17 is not supported.  
The results of all the Hypotheses are summarized in Table 15: 
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Table 15: The Results of Hypotheses Testing 
Hypothesis Result 
H1 (IQ) Supported 
H2 (CD) Supported 
H3 (GS) Not Supported 
H4 (OT) Not Supported 
H5 (IQ*GS) Supported 
H6 (CD*GS) Not Supported 
H7 (IQ*OT) Supported 
H8 (CD*OT) Not Supported 
H9a (RD) Supported 
H9b (MA) Not Supported 
H9c (MF) Supported 
H10 (RD*GS) Not Supported 
H11 (RD*OT) Supported 
H12 (RD*IQ) Supported 
H13 (RD*CD) Not Supported 
H14 (MA*IQ) Supported 
H15 (MA*CD) Not Supported 
H16 (MF*IQ) Supported 
H17 (MF*CD) Not Supported 
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CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION 
6.1 Findings and Conclusions 
In perspective of some traditional theories, as transaction cost theory, we 
found that it’s difficult to explain some strategy choice of internationalization for 
Chinese MNCs. In China, aside from the host country environment, home 
country institutional factors such as government support and ownership type are 
critical factors in the outward movement of Chinese multinationals. State-owned 
enterprises from these countries are more inclined to take challenges of investing 
directly in unfamiliar institutional environment than private firms. Government 
support and their ownership type offer SOEs significant advantages in their 
overseas expansion. The effect of government support is even greater when firms 
enter countries with high institutional quality and greater cultural distance. Thus, 
different from multinationals from advanced economies, the home country 
institutions may play an important role in the internationalization of EMMNCs 
and moderate the effects of host country institutional factors on the entry modes 
of firms. Governments from emerging market economies can strategically 
support firms' expansion in certain country markets when they pursue important 
opportunities or assets overseas. More importantly, the results of our study 
suggest that the home government support and ownership type alone do not 
affect the entry mode of firms in a significant way. Government support at home 
by itself and the state-owned status alone would not propel firms to engage in 
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foreign direct investment, but only interact with the host institutional factors. 
Therefore, we emphasize the role of home institutional factors in affecting firms’ 
perceptions and tolerance of risks. 
Moreover, cultural distance remains a significant barrier for EMMNCs to 
invest directly in foreign markets, which is true for both SOEs and private firms 
from the emerging market of China. SOEs are more likely to adopt the equity 
mode than private firms, especially when expanding in countries of high 
institutional quality. But with home government support, firms are more likely to 
adopt the equity or FDI mode in markets of high institutional quality and great 
cultural distance. Meanwhile, ownership type alone do not affect the entry mode 
of firms in a significant way. 
At last, in addition to the institutional factors, the investment type also have 
significant influence on the equity mode choice between WOS and JV. Firms 
making R&D investment are more likely to choose the high equity mode (WOS) 
to protect the specific asset. This is quite consistent with the transaction cost 
theory. Particularly, the institutional factors also have influence on the entry 
modes in a certain investment type (R&D, Market-seeking and Manufacturing). 
The effect of institutional factors on equity modes would vary by the investment 
types. However, the host institutional factors are more import than the home 
institutional factors, especially for market-seeking and manufacturing investment 
types. 
Thus, different from multinationals from advanced economies, the home 
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country institutions may play an important role in the internationalization of 
EMMNCs. These findings on the effect of home country institutional factors on 
the outward entry modes choice shed some new light on entry mode choice of 
firms from less developed countries and call for more empirical studies of 
outward internationalization of EMMNCs.  
6.2 Implications 
The present study contributes to both theoretical and practical implications 
on the   internationalization of firms. Theoretically, this research provides 
several important contributions to our understanding of institutional factors and 
investment types with respect to entry modes. First, we look on the impacts of 
institutions on internationalization from a rapidly developing country’s view, 
which is different from the previous studies that focus on developed countries, 
and different from some studies also focusing on developing countries (Bruton, 
Ahlstrom & Puky, 2009). Unlike other developing countries, China is a rapidly 
developing country and most of China’s firms have finished the first stage of 
internationalization, i.e. inward internationalization and are beginning to 
implement outward internationalization. This is suitable to central government’s 
policies as can be seen in many significant meetings held by China’s central 
government and Chinese Communist Party. So government support is an 
important index measuring the institutional differences among firms of various 
entry modes. Second, we examine the effects of dual institutions on entry modes, 
which are often neglected by the previous studies. Interestingly, home country’s 
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institutions and the host country’s institutions appear to influence foreign 
subsidiaries in opposite directions, which confirm the institutional theory of two 
institutional mechanisms: isomorphism and distinctiveness (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Hannan & Freeman, 1977). Finally, our research shows that for developing 
countries like China, decision making of R&D investment and market-seeking 
investment also have interaction effect with the institutional factors. 
Practically, the findings of this study have meaningful implications for 
government on public policy making and for firms on strategy development and 
their internationalization endeavors. The Chinese Government has long realized 
that outward internationalization is important to inward FDI. To some extent, this 
study provides support the government policy of going out”, in that government 
can play a critical role in promoting outward activities and internationalization. 
By developing more promotion for outward activities to satisfy the technology 
and market needs of Chinese firms. It may be necessary for the upper level 
management of Chinese firms to think more strategically and effectively about 
the role of outward activities in the internationalization process. 
6.3. Limitations and Future Studies 
This research considers how dual institutions influence the entry mode 
decisions in light of investment types from the perspective of developing country 
firms. Although we focus on China’s MNCs, we can offer some insight into the 
effect of home country institutional factors under similar conditions, shed some 
new light on entry mode choice of firms from less developed countries, and call 
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for more empirical studies of outward internationalization of EMMNCs. 
Meanwhile, there are some unavoidable limitations for this study. First, it is 
limited to the data from only one home country and may not be apply to firms 
from other emerging market economies. The sampled firms are relatively small 
in comparison with large state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In China, small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) receive less support from the central 
government and are also less subject to the influence of government agenda. The 
relatively small size of the sampled firms may affect the significance of the 
results. Moreover, we did not take institutional changes into consideration. Since 
EMMNCs have long operated in complex institutional environments, institutions 
changes may affect their internationalization efforts as time passes by.   
Future research can include firms from other emerging market economies, 
test these hypotheses in other country environments, and provide more 
convincing evidence on the effect of home institutional factors on the entry 
modes choice of multinationals from less developed economies. It is also 
necessary to compare the motivations and internationalization patterns of SMEs 
with those of SOEs. Future studies should adopt a longitudinal approach and 
explore the impact of changing institutions at home on the internationalization of 
firms from emerging market countries. The effects of these home and host 
institutional factors on the management strategies and performance of these 
EMMNCs in overseas markets of different institutional environments also 
warrant systematic investigation. 
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Appendix A 
Related Questions in the Questionnaire 
Section 1 General Information 
1. Your Company Name:       
2. Company Location: Province:             City: 
3. Your 
Position/Title: 
*Please check the level of management position you are in: 
1) Top Level 
2) Middle Level 
4. Number of years you have worked at this company: ________ years. 
5. Telephone:     
(Please be  assured  that  you  will  not  be  contacted  again  
for  more questions.  Your phone number is requested to confirm a very 
small number of randomly selected participants ONLY.) 
Instruction for Completing the Questionnaire 
Please read the questions carefully and follow the instructions when 
answering the questions. We define “outward activities” as “firms start 
with no regular export activities, begin to export via agents, and then 
establish their own foreign sales subsidiaries, and finally move to 
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production by investing in foreign market.  
Section 2 General Information about Your Company 
Please note that the following “company” means the parent firm. It doesn’t 
matter if you don’t work in the parent firm because what I need is the 
related information you provide. 
1. What is the legal character of your company? Please check only one 
answer. 
1. State-Owned Enterprises                  7.Other Other 
Collective-Owned Enterprises 
2. Collective Enterprise                     8. Wholly State-Owned 
Enterprises 
3. Joint-Equity Enterprises                   9. Limited Liability Company 
in other forms 
4. Joint State-State Enterprise                 10. Company Limited by 
shares 
5. Collective Joint Ownership Enterprises        11. Privately-Owned 
Enterprises 
6. Joint State-Collective Ownership Enterprises    12. Other Domestic-Funded 
Enterprises 
 
2. How many full-time employees does your company totally have now?  
 
Employees  
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1）1－99    2）100－499     3）500－999    4）1000-4999    5) 5000-9999   6）
10000－49999   7）50000－99999     8）more than 100000 
3. When was your company started?  
 
Year 
4. Which industry is your company’s primary business activity? Please 
circle only one answer. 
1. Mining and Forestry 
2. Manufacture of foods 
3. Beverage Manufacturing 
4. Tobacco processing 
5. Textiles 
6. Clothing and Other Fibred Products 
7. Leather, Fur, and Feather (Down) Products 
8. Wood Processing and Bamboo, Rattan, and Straw Products 
9. Furniture manufacturing 
10. Paper manufacturing and Paper Products 
11. Educational and Sports Products Manufacturing 
12. Oil Processing and coking 
13. Chemical Raw Material and Chemical Products 
14. Medicine Manufacturing 
15. Chemical Fibres Manufacturing 
16. Rubber Products 
17. Plastic Products 
18. Non-metal Mineral Products 
19. Ferrous Metals Smelting & Rolling Processing 
20. Metal Products 
21. General Machinery Manufacturing 
22. Special Equipment Manufacturing 
23. Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 
24. Electrical Machinery and Equipment 
25. Electronic and Communication Equipment 
26. Instruments, Meters, Educational and Office Equipment 
27. Othe  
5. So far, what kinds of outward activities does your company have? Please 
check all the answers that apply to your company.  
A. Exporting.  
B. Franchising.  
C. Licensing. 
D. Establishing the oversea sales department  
E. Joint Venture in oversea markets. 
F. Wholly owned foreign investment. (Merge and Acquisition) .  
G.. Wholly owned foreign investment. (Greenfield). 
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Pleas
e 
note: 
1=Much 
Less 
2=Less 3=A
little 
Less
4=Sam
e 
5=A 
Little 
More
6=More 7=Much
More 
H. Setting up oversea manufacturing or operation. 
 
6. Compared to other companies in the same industry, to what extent, your 
company has engaged in “outward activities”? Please evaluate using a 
7-point scale.  
 
 
 
 
6.1 Exporting. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6.2 Franchising. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6.3 Licensing. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6.4 Establishing the oversea sales
d t t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6.5 Joint Venture in oversea markets. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6.6 Wholly owned foreign investment.
(Merge 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6.7 Wholly owned foreign investment.
(Greenfield) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6.8 Setting up oversea manufacturing or
operation. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6.9 Compared with top competitors, we
have 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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7. until 2009, in which country or district your company has taken “outward activities”? Please tick all the answers that apply to your 
company.  
             
Entry Modes 
Countries 
Export Contracting FDI 
Direct 
Export 
Establis
hing the 
Oversea 
Sales 
Depart
ment 
Manuf
acturi
ng 
Contr
act 
Techn
ology 
Contr
act 
Sal
es 
Co
ntra
ct 
modes Money Amount 
(Ten Thousand Dollar) 
Wholly 
Owned  
Subsidiar
y 
Joint  
Venture 
Merge 
And 
Acquisitio
n 
Oversea 
manufactu
ring 
0 
- 
99 
100 
- 
999 
1000 
- 
9999 
More than  
One hundred 
million 
 
1 
Asian 
1.1 Japan              
1.2 Korea              
1.3Hong Kong              
1.4 Singapore              
1.5 Vietnam              
1.6 India               
1.7 Thailand               
1.8 Others              
2 
Africa 
2.1 South Africa              
2.2 Sudan               
2.3 Guinea              
2.4 Nigeria               
2.5 Madagascar              
2.6 Others               
3 
Europe 
3.1 Britain               
3.2 Germany               
3.3 France               
3.4 Russia              
3.5 Holland               
3.6 Others               
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4  
North 
America 
4.1 U.S.               
4.2 Canada               
5 
Oceania 
5.1 Australia               
5.2 New Zealand              
5.3 Others              
6 
Latin 
America 
6.1 Mexico              
6.2 Brazil              
6.3 Argentina              
6.4 the Bahamas              
6.5 Cayman 
Islands
             
6.6 Others              
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Please 
note: 
1=Absolutely 
Disagreement 
2=Strongly 
Disagreement 
3=Somewhat 
Disagreement 
4=Neutral 5=Absolutely 
Agreement 
6=Strongly 
Agreement 
7=Somewh 
at 
Agreement 
8. Please indicate your level of agreement/disagreement on the following statement using a 
7-point scale.  
 
     
 
 
 
11.1 Chinese   government   made 
policies   to 
encourage our company to develop 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
112 When our company met the entry 
barriers 
made by host country, Chinese 
government would  help  us  to 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11.3 Chinese  government  kept  close 
relation with host countries to help our 
company to 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11.4 Chinese government helped our 
company 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11.5 Chinese  government  provided 
favorable 
loan policy  to  our  company  to 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. What percentage does the foreign sales account for the total sales? (Based on the latest 
annual report) 
 
% 
10. What percentage do the foreign assets account for the total assets? (Based on the latest 
annual report) 
 
% 
11. How many countries where your company has subsidiaries? (Based on the latest annual 
report) 
 
 
 
 
12. How many foreign countries does your company operate? 
 
 
 
 
13. What percentage do the overseas subsidiaries account for the total subsidiaries? (Based 
on the latest annual report) 
 
  %  
 
                                                     
 
 99
14. How many oversea manufacturing or operations does your company have among the 
oversea subsidiaries? 
 
%  
 
 
15. How many average years of international experience do top managers in your company 
have? 
(Please note: TM is defined as the top two tiers of executives, including all chairmen, 
presidents, CEOs, and the first level of vice presidents of its equivalent (Wiersema & Bantel, 
1992). International Experience is defined as the average number of years the TM members have 
spent abroad on assignment and/or in higher education, or in an international division (Sambharya, 
1996) 
  Years (Please Note: The number could be a approximate number) 
 
 
16. What percentage does the sales from all overseas subsidiaries account for the total sales? 
(Based on the latest annual report) 
  % 
 
17. What percentage does the productions from overseas manufacturing account for 
the total productions?  (Based on the latest annual report) 
  % 
 
 
18. How much turn over do your company (including all subsidiaries) have? (Based on the latest 
annual report) 
  RMB 
 
 
 
19. How many assets does your company (including all subsidiaries) have? (Based on the latest 
annual report) 
   RMB 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for participating in the study! 
If you wish to receive a copy of the research report, please kindly leave your mailing or 
email address. It will be used only for sending you the report! 
Your name: Street Add: 
City/Province: Zip Code: 
Email: 
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